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ABSTRACT 
Twenty years of constant conflict in multiple regions across the globe have 
created a problem for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM): it has 
become over reliant on lethality to achieve its strategic goals. This overreliance on 
lethality and the lethality default culture that has taken hold in USSOCOM has begun to 
have second- and third-order effects as the United States moves into a renewed period 
of great power competition. While great power competition historically has included 
periods of conflict and peace, large-scale combat operations remain less 
prevalent. This research investigated how special operations forces (SOF) can find the 
optimal balance of lethality along with other elements of national power and determined 
that balancing lethality with other instruments of national power can help increase 
the effectiveness of SOF operations, while supporting a whole-of-government 
approach. This thesis also addressed how SOF engages with the civil domain and 
expands its engagements to elements outside of security across the physical domain. 
This study found that USSOCOM must balance how much lethality it uses in 
great power competition while holistically evaluating other instruments of national 
power, depending on the conditions prevalent in each region or country that SOF 
engages in. Ultimately, this research determined that lethality alone cannot achieve 
victory in most modern conflicts. 
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United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) over relies on lethality 
to solve security issues in the global environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
continues to emphasize a return to lethal capabilities, asserting this will enable the U.S. to 
remain competitive in the competition phase. As the world grows increasingly complex, 
competitors of the United States continue to diversify the military capabilities available at 
their disposal to achieve their political objectives. Competitor approaches to competition 
include fusing civil and military capabilities, while leveraging multiple instruments of 
national power simultaneously, and growing their presence in the civil domain daily. This 
thesis researches how USSOCOM can enable the U.S. government to effectively compete 
in conflict and competition through an optimal balance of the elements of national power. 
This research investigates five case studies and used the DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, 
Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Law Enforcement) model to analyze each case 
study to assess what the optimal balance of each instrument of national power can be most 
effective in achieving a political agenda. Case Study #1, Colombia 2000–2020, identifies 
how the historically low U.S. military presence allowed the U.S. government to 
synchronize operations across DIMEFIL as it advised their Colombian government 
counterparts. Case Study #2, The Greek Civil War 1945–1949, uncovers a case where more 
lethality and military support enabled victory by overwhelming the communist backed 
insurgents with military assistance, firepower, and material support. Case Study #3, The 
Philippines, 2001–2020, looks at how USSOCOM helped Philippines’ security forces fight 
back against a budding Islamic extremist insurgency problem in internal areas of the 
Philippines. Case Study #4, Russian Annexation of Crimea in 2014, analyzes what 
strategies the Russian Federation employed in a hybrid environment across DIMEFIL to 
effect the annexation of Crimea and challenge the legitimacy of Ukraine. The final case 
study, Case Study #5, Afghanistan 2001–2020, investigates how much force is too much 
in the use of both special operations and conventional forces in a war with the Taliban and 
other factions still battling for control of the war-torn country. 
xvi 
This research found that while no two cases are ever the same, themes emerged 
from each case study that may apply to future conflicts. DIMEFIL is a simple model that 
has its own limitations and should not be the singular strategic tool for USSOCOM to craft 
a campaign for competition or conflict. Additionally, any agency or force seeking to 
leverage multiple elements of national power should find an optimal balance of each 
element that can be adjusted for the conditions of the operating environment. To be 
competitive in great power competition, USSOCOM must become comfortable operating 
in, through and with the civil domain and respective elements. Military training which 
includes exercises will always be necessary, but as the U.S. competitors adapt their 
approaches over time, the lines between the civil and military domains will continue to 
become intertwined. As such, USSOCOM must now learn how to operate and leverage 
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Twenty years of constant conflict in multiple regions across the globe has created 
a problem for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM): it has become 
over-reliant on lethality to achieve its strategic goals. This over-reliance on lethality, and 
the lethality default culture that has taken hold in USSOCOM has evolved into having 
second and third order effects as the United States moves into a renewed period of great 
power competition. Lethality enables USSOCOM to excel at responding to crises, and U.S. 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) is often the first U.S. element to engage emerging 
threats. However, looking at the future of great power competition and the current shift in 
global geopolitics where threats to American interests abroad continue to rise, the 
USSOCOM must adjust its investment strategy in its use of special operations forces (SOF) 
if it wants to successfully address the many threats of the future. The future of conflict will 
require the USSOCOM to address the civil component in new ways where capabilities look 
more like a comprehensive social media marketing strategy rather than an antiquated leaflet 
drop. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer two questions: How can SOF find parity in its 
investment strategy for great power competition across all instruments of national 
power? What role does the civil domain play in an investment strategy for great 
power competition? This thesis examines two hypotheses. First, no element of national 
power alone can create conditions for victory in a conflict or great power competition, and 
that the optimal balance between all elements must be found for SOF operations to be most 
effective. Second, leveraging the civil component of the operational environment helps 
SOF find the optimal balance of the instruments of national power, making SOF operations 
more effective.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Some research suggests elements of large-scale combat operations and lethality will 
be required in the future and that the probability of direct confrontation with near-peer 
 
2 
threats such as China or Russia continues to increase.1 Other scholars feel that irregular 
warfare is the future of conflict, and that the U.S. is “woefully unprepared for this type of 
competition.” 2  Policymakers seek to ensure technological advances enable soldier 
lethality, which can be defined as, “A holistic series of capabilities, equipment, training, 
and enhancements that span all fundamentals of combat to ensure Soldiers are more lethal 
and less vulnerable on the modern battlefield.” 3  Even fiscal management has been 
prioritized to focus on lethality: “Commanders and leaders at every level are responsible 
for ensuring every dollar appropriated to the Army is spent with the aim to build readiness 
and lethality across the force.”4 Expenditures during the Afghanistan war epitomize the 
U.S. Military’s overemphasis on lethality. Lethality, in the relative absence of a more 
comprehensive engagement strategy, has proven ineffective for achieving U.S. objectives 
after nearly twenty years of involvement in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
According to the Department of Defense, the total expenditure on the war in Afghanistan 
since October 2001 through September 2019 exceeded $778 billion.5 Compared to the U.S. 
State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), only $44 
billion was spent on development and reconstruction projects. The U.S. government (USG) 
has the capability and the capacity to pursue a range of governmental and non-
governmental activities and policies, which is why it is imperative for strategic planners to 
consider other elements of influence besides just lethality and force. While the competing 
narratives around the future of conflict continue to create friction within the department, 
what is clear is that if the DOD fails to develop an investment strategy specifically for SOF 
 
1 Raphael Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 53, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2849z1.html. 
2 Seth G. Jones, “The Future of Competition: U.S. Adversaries and the Growth of Irregular Warfare,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 4th, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-
competition-us-adversaries-and-growth-irregular-warfare. 
3 Department of Defense,  The Army Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: United States Army, 2018),  8. 
https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf. 
4 Department of Defense, 8. 




for the future, the United States may lose several strategic advantages it has developed over 
decades. 
Great power competition historically included periods of conflict and peace, with 
large scale combat operations remaining less prevalent. The civil domain of the 
contemporary operating environment presents the greatest opportunity for USSOCOM to 
position itself strategically, so it is poised to gain strategic advantages when opportunities 
are presented, and ready to tackle crises as they arise. One of those opportunities is 
USSOCOM’s ability to develop resistance capabilities in partner nations across Europe 
and the Pacific. Often, resistance capabilities reside mostly within the capacity of the civil 
population or civil government, not the military. The civil domain also presents the greatest 
risks for USSOCOM, as adversaries of the U.S. currently operate extensively in this 
domain, blurring the line between civil and military capabilities. Bukkvoll discusses how 
Russian SOF leveraged the civilian population in to impose more cost on the Ukrainian 
military Russia in the Donbas and Donetsk regions,.6 The USG has made its fair share of 
strategic blunders in failing to understand and engage with the civil society in past 
operations. The most recent Irregular Warfare Annex of the National Defense Strategy is 
clear: “Institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and 
special operations forces, sustaining the ability to impose costs and create dilemmas for 
our adversaries across the full spectrum of competition and conflict.”7 
If USSOCOM desires to support this initiative, then it must delve into the civil 
domain, get comfortable working with entities outside of security forces, and capitalize on 
opportunities to combine approaches with organizations from select unified action 
 
6 Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas.” Parameters (Carlisle, 
Pa.: 2016), ProQuest. 
7 Department of Defense, Summary of Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy 




partners.8 Culture, economics, and politics that make up the civil society matter, often 
more than the military aspects of a country. Operating in the civil domain means engaging 
with organizations and entities with which the U.S. military does not  traditionally engage. 
Warfare in the future, whether in the space below armed conflict or above that threshold, 
could require not just military action, but a combination of other elements of national 
power, be it economic, political or other. USSOCOM is in a unique position, as its forces 
are currently deployed to 62 countries, coming off of a recent high of nearly 141 countries 
in 2019.9 While USSOCOM’s global posture is limited compared to recent years, U.S. 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) still presents an opportunity to expand its reach in 
support of the national defense strategy of the U.S.. Historically, USSOF are deployed to 
locations outside the realm of normal military activities, often engaging with numerous 
organizations and elements through the normal course of their assigned missions and 
duties. Now more than ever USSOCOM should identify ways to increase this engagement 
with elements of the operating environment, specifically in the civil domain, that are not 
normally engaged with by their conventional counterparts.  
A key model used throughout the research presented in this thesis is DIMEFIL, 
which model includes the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, and law 
enforcement elements of national power or statecraft. DIMEFIL will be used to evaluate 
how SOF integrates its operations into other elements of national power beyond the 
 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 30 (Washington, D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf JP 30 defines Unified 
Action as, “a comprehensive approach that focuses on coordination and cooperation of the U.S. military 
and other interorganizational participants toward common objectives, even if the interorganizational 
participants to refer collectively to USG departments and agencies (i.e., interagency partners); state, 
territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies (i.e., multinational 
partners); NGOs; and the private sector. Joint forces must be prepared to plan and execute operations with 
forces from partner nations (PNs) within the framework of an alliance or coalition under U.S. or other-than-
US leadership. By law, the President retains command authority over U.S. forces. participants are not 
necessarily part of the same command or organization.” x-xi.  
9 Corey Dickstein, “Fewest number of special ops forces deployed since 2001,” Stars and Stripes, 




military element. DIMEFIL represents the various elements a nation has at its disposal to 
affect its grand strategy in the international system.10 
The United States government (USG) exists in a strange DIMEFIL capability 
paradox. The U.S. Department of Defense has an annual budget of over $740 billion, yet 
makes up such a relatively small component of engagement across the globe with parts of 
the operational environment, security forces and militaries of partner countries.11 Compare 
this to the U.S. State Department that has an annual budget of $77.1 billion, yet is tasked 
with maintaining the diplomatic ties of over 180 countries around the globe with 58,000 
personnel, less than a tenth of the personnel the military has access to including the 
reserves, all the while promoting American ideals and values.12 The USG’s culture of 
bureaucracy and reduced coordination and collaboration between various agencies has 
created a gap in U.S. foreign policy. Its largest, most well-funded and equipped arm, the 
U.S. military, is responsible for competing in and promoting U.S. interests in only a 
fraction of the operational environment. The remainder of the USG, when the budgets are 
combined and personnel tallied up, still do not add up to the resources at the disposal of 
the DOD, and yet remains tasked with dealing with everything outside of the realm of 
security. This creates a challenging paradigm for the U.S. as it moves into this era of 
renewed great power competition, and attempts to conduct hybrid warfare, or fight in the 
gray zone depending on which terminology one subscribes to.13 
Differing forecasts of future conflict present a challenge in determining the 
investments SOF needs to make to achieve its strategic goals. Adversaries of the U.S. are 
currently fusing civil and military capabilities below the threshold of armed conflict to gain 
 
10 John P. McDonnell, “National Strategic Planning: Linking DIMEFIL/PMESII to a Theory of 
Victory,” (Master’s Thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2009) 11, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/
ADA530210.pdf. 
11 Department of Defense. “DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Proposal,” (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Defense. February 10, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/
Article/2079489/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2021-budget-proposal/. 
12 Department of State, Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
State, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/FY-2020-Agency-Financial-Report.pdf 
13 Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside, “‘Blurred Lines’: Gray Zone Conflict and Hybrid War- Two 




strategic advantages over the U.S. Often, these threats emerge in the civil domain, or civil 
component of the operational environment. These operations in the civil domain present a 
problem for the U.S. and USSOCOM. Traditionally, USSOCOM supports the rest of the 
U.S. military as it focuses on fighting and winning wars through direct action and large-
scale combat operations. While lethality continues to be a necessity in the future, the 
USSOCOM must identify how it will compete in the civil domain, otherwise it may lose 
strategic advantages when crises arise. 
C. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify how USSOCOM can best find the optimal 
proportions between lethality and other elements of national power across the DIMEFIL 
spectrum at the ideal times. A secondary objective of this thesis is to identify how SOF can 
integrate all the elements of national power so that it can leverage the civil domain and 
gain strategic advantages for great power competition. This thesis will analyze the 
effectiveness of SOF operating in the civil domain and determine to what benefit or 
detriment those operations had on the overall outcome of the mission. It also seeks to show 
that the civil domain presents the greatest opportunities and greatest risks for USSOCOM 
due to the complex nature of the civil domain.  
Currently, there is a lack of research that addresses how SOF leverages other 
elements of national power while operating in the civil domain. Additionally, past research 
has focused on how SOF operates with other agencies of the USG, yet it falls short because 
it assumes that only SOF can conduct military and security focused operations. No 
extensive research exists that accurately describes how SOF could find the optimal balance 
of instruments of national power by leveraging the civil domain. This thesis will not 
propose an enormous shift in foreign policy or a change in the budgeting and resource 
appropriations of various agencies. It will instead provide a new lens with which the USG 
can better understand the civil domain and how it relates to the instruments of national 
power. 
Competing in the civil domain can provide a way to operationalize an entire 
population center not just in war time, but in any crisis. When a tactical commander moves 
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into a contested space with the task of securing that area, two things come to mind: fire and 
maneuver. This is exactly how the military is trained to think. Our military is trained to 
rapidly identify and prosecute the most dangerous of threats to U.S. forces and their 
mission, while prioritizing the deadliest first. But what if the most dangerous course of 
action of our adversaries is not their direct and indirect fire capabilities? What if the most 
dangerous course of action for our adversaries is the mobilization and intentionality of their 
societal civil components, which is currently happening in the shadows? Take for example 
the use of Russian biker gangs that have been used by the Kremlin to advance political 
agendas by riding throughout the Baltics and Balkans of Europe, expanding the reach and 
influence of the Russian oligarchy. 14  Putin uses these groups because they are cost 
effective, as they do not require government expenditure, and they align with the goals of 
the oligarchy. China has taken a similar approach as it builds out its maritime capabilities. 
The functioning maritime militia is one of the ways the People Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) has extended its influence in the predominantly maritime domain of the Pacific.15 
China has steadily increased its maritime militia forces over the last five years. This is in 
addition to growing its coast guard and traditional naval capabilities. Russia and China are 
continually finding cheap solutions to imposing cost on the U.S. through non-military 
means. This increase in focus on non-military capabilities represents the growing 
challenges that USSOF continue to face from competitors in the civil domain. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a series of case studies where SOF’s involvement in the civil 
environment varied in affecting the trajectory of the conflict. It will employ the DIMEFIL 
model to analyze each case study and assess what proportions of DIMEFIL are necessary 
to craft an effective campaign for great power competition, throughout the civil domain. 
More so, specific analysis will be conducted to identify how SOF best integrates across the 
DIMEFIL spectrum as it interacts with other agencies in the USG and how SOF can 
 
14 Peleschuk, Dan. “Hardcore Russian Biker Gang About to Invade Poland,” GlobalPost. 
https://www.pri.org/stories/hardcore-russian-biker-gang-about-invade-poland 
15 Jonathan Pyke, “The risks of China’s ambitions in the South Pacific” The Brookings Last Modified 
July 20, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific/ 
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otherwise operate in the civil domain. Lastly, case study analysis aims to investigate how 
synchronizing operations from each element of the DIMEFIL model can contribute to a 
successful strategy. 
Each case study chosen for this research offers a different viewpoint as to how to 
balance USSOCOM’s approach to competition. In Case Study #1: Colombia, 2000 - 2020, 
this thesis argues that USSOF has been successful in finding parity among the instruments 
of DIMEFIL which created conditions for Colombia to successfully start exporting security 
to other countries that require security assistance. For Case Study #2: the Greek Civil War 
1945–1949, it argues that since SOF had not been formally established up to that point as 
a modern irregular warfare force, conventional forces took on the role of finding the 
appropriate proportions of DIMEFIL to defeat a budding communist insurgency. This case 
study raises the question of when do lethality investments need to be increased significantly 
when compared to other elements of national power. Case Study #3: The Philippines 2001–
2020, this thesis offers up another success story where USSOF played a significant role in 
reducing the spread and effectiveness of violent extremist organizations such as Abu 
Sayyaf and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - Philippines (ISIS-Philippines). Case Study #4: 
The 2014 Russian Annexation of Crimea, this thesis argues that Russia leveraged its SOF 
and used the appropriate amount of each element of DIMEFIL to successfully annex 
Crimea. In Case Study #5, Afghanistan 2001–2020, I argue that USSOF failed to find 
balance among the elements of DIMEFIL, which is why this conflict continues to persist 
with no real victory in sight. In the ninth chapter, “Common Themes and Threads,” I sum 
up key lessons learned across each of these case studies, and hypothesize what conditions 
and approaches enabled either victory or failure across each of these case studies. Finally, 
this thesis concludes with exploring the limitations of research presented here, 
recommendations as to how USSOCOM can best leverage all instruments of DIMEFIL, 
avenues for future research, and concluding thoughts on how instruments of national power 




II. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
In time of Great Power Competition in the Pacific theater, competitors of the United 
States have increasingly begun fusing civil and military capabilities and strategies to 
achieve state political objectives as they leverage their elements of national power. USSOF 
must identify ways to compete in the civil domain if it wishes to influence the operating 
environment as the civil component makes up much of the environment. The USSOF 
engagement in the past focused primarily on engaging with partner forces focused in the 
realm of security. While this creates some short- and long-term gains in the security 
environment, opportunities for increased returns diminish as what happens in the civil 
environment affects the security environment.  
A. CHINESE GOALS AND USE OF NON-MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is expanding its sphere of influence with its 
rapidly adapting forces and desire for global hegemony in the face of the U.S. global 
establishment of power.16 This ambition challenges the ‘de facto’ U.S. position as the sole 
global power after the end of Cold War in 1991.17 Just as the United States adopted a 
predatory approach against the declining Soviet Union in 1983–1989, it is reasonable to 
assume China would take the same approach in preying on the United States. Its desired 
hegemony is backed by Chinese pursuit of economic dominance with its current share of 
14.08% of the global economy in 2018, and rising year over year with the U.S. slowly 
losing global economic share of 0.65% in the same time period.18 The trade wars between 
the U.S. and China have escalated rapidly in the past five years. Chinese economic 
investments have spread to many countries throughout Asia and Africa (countries with 
abundant natural resources). In the end, China may pursue the annexation of sovereign 
 
16 China Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia, 116th Congress, May 9, 2019, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg36214/pdf/CHRG-116hhrg36214.pdf. 
17 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power 
Shifts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), Project Muse. 




territory in the region such as islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and even Taiwan, 
in a campaign similar to the likes of the illegal annexation of South Ossetia or Crimea by 
the Russians.19 China has recently undergone a suite of military reforms to meet the 
capabilities demonstrated throughout the United States in the last thirty years of conflicts, 
including the DOD’s ability to utilize joint operations and sophisticated weapons and 
platforms against inferior opponents.20 USSOF has consistently delivered lethal effects 
utilizing precision weapons, special reconnaissance and close operations to enemy 
positions. China has made investments in not only its ability to meet the U.S. in armed 
conflict but also its ability to conduct irregular warfare, and seeks to develop its information 
warfare capability, demonstrated during the Hong Kong protests where China or a China 
state backed actor attempted to respond to the changing situation in Hong Kong on 
Twitter.21 
The Chinese are also very forward in using non-military components as an 
extension of their military capability to be able to apply resources from all elements of 
national power towards advancing its political objectives. Take for example China’s 
extensive use of the American film industry to promote pro-Chinese themes. 22  Pen 
America, a human and literary rights group, details in their report Made in Hollywood, 
Censored by Beijing how China continues to develop its influence on the American film 
industry to not only censor what comes into China, but also promote PRC-regime friendly 
messages to non-Chinese audiences.23 As the Chinese find alternate ways to challenge 
 
19 Maia Otarashvili, “Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia Continues,” Last Modified April 11, 
2017, FPRI online, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/04/russias-quiet-annexation-south-ossetia-continues/ 
20 Andrew Schobell, China’s Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020): https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2798.html, 86. 
21 Tom Uhren, Elise Thomas, and Jacob Wallis, “Tweeting Through the Great Firewall: Preliminary 
Analysis of PRC Linked Information Operations on the Hong Kong Protests,” (Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute: September 2019), https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-12/
Tweeting%20through%20the%20great%20fire%20wall.pdf?TRGkGXh8FPY5KXLSc_4SfDUy7sMfNkw0
. 
22 Benjamin Lee, “China continues to exert damaging influence on Hollywood, report finds,” The 
Guardian, August 5th, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/aug/05/china-hollywood-films-
damaging-impact-report. 




U.S. influence around the globe, and in its own backyard, the importance of finding 
creative approaches to incorporating non-military elements into military operations and 
objectives continues to grow in importance. 
B. RUSSIA’S GOALS AND USE OF NON-MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
Russia’s economic challenges following the end of the cold war forced Russia to 
seek asymmetric methods of warfare in areas such as the civil domain to continue to 
challenge U.S. hegemony. After the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had 
several economic issues to rectify if it wished to grow its global position, while sorting 
through the Soviet era policies and culture that was left over from the Cold War. Yet Russia 
has found asymmetric ways to make what resources it does have go further. Russia has 
made significant investments in its special operations units such as its Spetsnaz units which 
make up Russia’s unconventional warfare capability. This capability was highlighted 
throughout the Crimean campaign.24 Additionally, Russian interior troops are generally 
left responsible for a counter-SOF role, focusing specifically on western and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF. 25 Russia continues to develop its private military 
contracting resources that blur the lines between public policy and private interests for the 
regime.26 Russia’s investment in its SOF and private military capabilities enables it to 
engage in the civil domain, and operate in places that are traditionally viewed as not 
military action. This creates a dilemma for the USG, as it attempts to compete with Russia, 
with its military that has been almost exclusively focused on military action with most of 
its conventional forces. 
According to  “Russian Economic Policy and The Russian Economic System: 
Stability Versus Growth” by Philip Hanson, to reach its full potential Russia has focused 
on nine main economic and political objectives:  
 
24 Alexey Nikolsky, “Russian Special Operations Forces: Eight Years and Three Wars” Elite 
Warriors: Special Operations Forces from Around the Globe (East View Press, 2017). 
25 Nikolsky, 31. 
26 Tor Bukkvoll, “Russia and the use of force in the new Cold War – The Military Dimension,” 
Presentation at Naval Postgraduate School, 24 October 2018. 
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1. Ensure sustainable natural population growth;  
2. Increase life expectancy to 78 years;  
3. Ensure sustainable growth of wages and pensions above inflation;  
4. Halve the numbers of people living in poverty; 
5. Improve housing conditions for at least 5 million households annually; 
6. Increase the share of innovating organizations (a curious measure that 
is officially monitored) to 50 per cent;  
7. Speed up the digitization of the economy and the social sphere;  
8. Become one of the world’s five largest economies. with growth rates 
above the global average and inflation below 4 per cent;  
9. Support high-productivity, export-oriented businesses in the key sectors 
of the economy, doubling non-raw-material and non-energy exports.27 
 
These aspirations create opportunities for Russia to ascend to regional hegemony 
again. If not achieved, it begs the question what risks will Russia take to move itself back 
on top again?28 Russian gross domestic product (GDP) Growth declined from 2010 to 
2014 and even showed negative growth in 2015 before reverting positive again. Yet, these 
figures are still below the World GDP index.29 It is also interesting to take note of global 
politics that have occurred, as Putin initiated his campaign to claim Crimea in 2014.30 
While it is debatable as to the true intentions of Putin to seize Crimea, the campaign did 
 
27 Philip Hanson, “Russian Economic Policy and The Russian Economic System: Stability versus 
Growth,” (London, UK: Chatham House, December 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/CHHJ7799-Russia-Economics-RP-WEB-FINAL.pdf 
28 Hanson, “Russian Economic Policy and The Russian Economic System: Stability versus Growth,” 
3. This report outlines the domestic and macroeconomic policies that Russia has implemented to achieve its 
listed economic objectives. It does not list the foreign policies that it may implement to achieve such 
economic goals.  
29 Hanson, 7. 




prove to be popular with the Russian people and increased Putin’s popularity and approval 
rating.31 
Seizing Crimea most likely did not improve the Russian economy significantly, 
especially as Russia has had to put nearly $10 billion into funding subsidies and major 
infrastructure projects for the area. However, the act communicates a strong position to the 
Russian people and the world.32 It also says that Russia can use a variety of means that 
were showcased in the Crimean conflict to achieve its political ends. 
C. COMPETING WITH GREAT POWERS 
Both Russia and China seek to grow their economies and have no issue using 
military power and other elements of DIMEFIL to do so. Often, Chinese and Russian 
objectives are regional in nature, yet they contrast with partners and allies of the U.S. 
leading to increased confrontation. The Chinese and Russian problem sets could give 
someone difficulty in seeing a clear way to deal with each respectively, not to mention the 
number of contingency operations facing the U.S. on a daily basis  reacting to every year. 
The need for an effective strategy is clear. In his book Rising Titans, Falling Giants 
Shrifinson gives some parting advice that can contribute to the discussion of how the U.S. 
deals with this era of great power competition: “the fate of declining states ultimately 
depends on what fundamental changes in the distribution of capabilities mean for rising 
states’ own power and security.”33 Both competitors have shown their willingness to adopt 
new capabilities to match the U.S. These resources present challenges for USSOF but can 
be overcome with enough guided investment from DOD through USSOCOM. 
  
 
31 Pifer, “Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation.” 
32 Pifer, “Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation.” 
33 Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A new era of warfare has emerged with advanced peer threats, hard to track non-
state actors, and a rise in diversity of non-governmental organizations that all increasingly 
transcend sovereign borders. This creates a complex problem for the application of force, 
and what the latest National Defense Strategy has coined as “lethality.”34 While traditional 
assessments of USSOF’s ability to conduct lethality are high, what has caused a problem 
for USSOF has been the emergence of what modern scholars coined as hybrid warfare.35 
When Frank Hoffman first developed the term, he probably did not know how much the 
term would create an organizational problem for the U.S. military. While this thesis will 
not talk specifically about hybrid warfare, balancing each element of DIMEFIL into one 
cohesive strategy while competing in the civil domain is part of a greater hybrid warfare 
strategy.  
A. COMPETITOR APPROACHES 
USG’s competitors have developed their own versions of hybrid warfare strategic 
thought. Russia has displayed classic examples of their hybrid warfare capabilities, by 
fusing civil and military capabilities and leveraging all elements of national power to 
achieve one singular and focused strategic objective, in their campaign to retake Crimea.36 
While Sun-Tzu was an ancient strategic philosopher, his writings radically shaped Eastern 
strategic thought. Mao Tse-Tung took ideas from Sun Tzu and brought them into the 
context of his struggle to develop a communist state in China in On Guerrilla Warfare and 
On Protracted War.37 The Chinese have their answer to great power competition, as 
 
34 The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 
December 2017). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf. 
35 Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/
potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf 
36 Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, RR1498 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html. 
37 Mao, Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America., 
1992); Mao, Zedong. On Protracted War (Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1967). 
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discussed in detail in Unrestricted Warfare, in which People’s Liberation Army of China 
Colonels Qiao Ling and Xiang describe an asymmetric strategy as a way to thwart the 
overwhelming U.S. lethality threat posed to China’s military forces.38 The Russians too 
have their answer to the next generation of warfare, that Valery Gerasimov highlights in 
“The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms 
and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations.”39 Both of these texts indicate that 
competitors of the U.S. recognize the value of a balanced approach to competition and 
conflict. 
Analyzing competitor policies and strategy allows the USSOF to find things to 
apply to a USSOF investment strategy while addressing and countering adversarial 
strategies. Both Russian and Chinese current and previous investment strategies in the civil 
domain can be identified through the use of the Arthur Lykke U.S. Army War College 
strategy model. 40  The Lykke strategy model is a stool that provides a base for the 
development of national security strategy, where each leg is made up of a component: ends, 
ways, means. It is a useful model in evaluating how strategies which are a combination of 
ends, ways, and means, come together to form different national security strategies of states 
to achieve their political agendas. However, the Lykke model is simple and does allow 
strategic crafting of creative solutions that address the often complex nature of security 
issues. Looking at competitors and the USGs strategic approaches across the DIMEFIL 
spectrum allows opportunities and challenges to emerge that can define a possible future 
for DOD SOF investment strategies in the civil domain. 
B. ORIGINS OF LETHALITY 
But where did this appetite for lethality for USSOF come from? Scholars have 
described the evolution of stakeholders and how SOF over time took over various key 
 
38 Liang Qiao, Al Santoli, and Xiangsui Wang. Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy 
America (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Pub., 2002). 
39 Valery Gerasimov. “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking 
the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations.” Military Review (2016, 96 (1): 23–29). 




positions in the Department of Defense that contributed to the increase in lethal capabilities 
over time, which could explain this drastic shift towards kinetic action.41 Robinson et al. 
cites a key turning point in this SOF revolution, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
that added a fourth Special Forces Battalion to each of the four existing Special Forces (SF) 
Groups, one additional Ranger Company to each of the existing Ranger Battalions, and 
increased Navy Sea, Air, Land Teams (SEAL) manning by 700 authorizations.42 These 
additional personnel increased the lethal capacity of USSOCOM to conduct more raids, 
gather intelligence for drone and air strikes, and dynamically target terrorist and insurgent 
actors around the globe. While no one would question the capabilities of these premier 
special operations forces, it begs the question were they the right forces the U.S. needed in 
the long run to win the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
The U.S. can chart a course for the future and how it deals with the largest 
component of the operating environment, the civil domain, with the use of its resources 
from the DOD, State Department, and other agencies. Joint Publication 30 defines the 
operating environment as: 
physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information 
environment (which includes cyberspace); as well as the electromagnetic 
spectrum (EMS), and involve conventional, special operations, ballistic 
missile, electronic warfare (EW), information, strike, cyberspace, and space 
capabilities. Included within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems 
that are relevant to a specific joint operation.43 
JP 3-0 recognizes the interactions among the various domains of the operating 
environment. For military operations to be successful, military planners must seek to 
combine capabilities and synchronize operations across multiple domains to create 
synergistic effects described in Cross Doman Synergy Joint Operations Planner’s Guide.44 
 
41 Linda Robinson, Austin Long, Kimberly Jackson, and Rebeca Orrie, Improving the Understanding 
of Special Operations: A Case History Analysis, RR2026 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2026.html.  
42 Robinson et al., 89–93. 
43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, 17. 
44 United States Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J7), “Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint 




This guide adequately describes how military operations are conducted in the various 
domains to achieve success, yet falls short in providing a model for planners to identify 
how to balance various elements of DIMEFIL. It also fails to describe the why, how and 
with what resources or capabilities to engage in the civil domain. 
C. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER  
The origin of the DIMEFIL model is not based on research. However, recent 
doctrine typically references the original version of DIMEFIL, DIME referring to the 
Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic instruments of national power. Other 
sources reference similar acronyms such as “MIDFIELD” adding the “D” for development 
at the end. One might consider DIMEFIL is a mental model -- a heuristic. Given that the 
problem presented here is complex, due to its many working parts, and often it is unclear 
what mechanism is causing a specific effect or result in the system that exists in the civil 
domain of the problem set, a systems approach will be used to analyze the problem. One 
tendency would be for strategic planners and policy makers in the U.S. to fall victim to the 
thinking traps of oversimplification or mirror imaging. Oversimplification in this strategic 
context could occur if strategic planners or leaders equated the nuances of each respective 
security threat or competitor, and used similar policies to address each either based on past 
experiences from situations that had some related elements, and then apply a comparable 
strategy to reach a goal. 45  Mirror imaging, which could even be a more potentially 
dangerous thinking trap for today’s strategic leaders and thinkers, occurs when the leader 
or planner makes the assumption that the other side or in this case competitor state, thinks 
and feels the same way that they do.46 Mirror imaging is particularly dangerous as it can 
alter the thinker’s perception of reality. John Boyd famously asserted in his Observe, 
Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop, if a state can alter the reality of their adversaries and 
create delays in their thinking to where what they perceive is much different than what is 
 
45 Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 
2008). 
46 Shore, 161–182. 
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actually happening in reality, they can gain an advantage.47 Through the use of deception 
and other techniques, it is quite feasible that this occurs frequently as the U.S. assesses the 
changing situation with its competitors. Cognitive biases and thinking traps are all prone 
to judgmental errors, which is why a systems approach is necessary to understand the 
problem more fully before determining possible strategies to address it. 
One key challenge in balancing each of the instruments of national power is the 
unarticulated and undefined vision of a future end-state that aligns with the political agenda 
of the United States and encompasses all the associated stakeholders of the USG. John 
McDonnell addresses this challenge through the use of a DIMEFIL/PMESII model to 
conceptualize and achieve a unified theory of victory.48 McDonnell goes on to describe 
how useful this model or a similar one can “record their logic and to track what the myriad 
activities of their plans are supposed to be accomplishing, then they would be able to better 
link those activities to the political end.”49 
D. PAST ATTEMPTS AT EVOLVING WITH THE CHANGING 
COMPLEXITY OF WARFARE 
The Department of the Army has tried to solve this problem of recognizing the 
changing face of warfare in the past and developed units that could potentially help strike 
a balance between security assistance and other elements of national power. As the U.S. 
Army Chief of Staff from 2011–2015, General Ray Odierno guided the U.S. Army to adopt 
a Regionally Aligned Forces concept, where whole divisions would be aligned with 
specific geographic combatant commands, to encourage unit leaders to begin 
understanding the cultural and geopolitical nuances of their assigned region.50 This idea 
has reached full concept and is employed to date, yet it does not fully address this issue of 
the often complicated civil and cultural components of problem sets faced in regions they 
 
47 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security. (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian, 2012). 
48 McDonnell, “ National Strategic Planning: Linking DIMEFIL/PMESII to a Theory of Victory,” 12. 
49 McDonnell, 3–4 
50 Kimberly Field et.al, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Business Not as Usual,” (U.S. Army War 
College, 2013), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a598574.pdf. 
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often find themselves deployed to. Units such as the 4th Infantry Division based out of Ft. 
Carson, Colorado has been aligned with the European theater for example, and deploys 
frequently throughout Europe.51 While the concept in theory should increase effectiveness 
of military operations in such locations, the reality is most of the time military operations 
remain focused on military exercises and military engagement. 
Military exercises have come a long way in developing synergy across the USG 
and enable the DOD to practice integrating with other agencies. Frazier and Hutto see 
multi-national military exercises (MME) as an opportunity to identify shortfalls in tactical 
military doctrine.52 Units historically only engage with select military partners, and focus 
on persistent engagement through security focused exercises such as the Defender exercise 
series which started in 2020 and seeks to incorporate a variety of partners across NATO 
annually.53 These exercises however are limited in scope and are focused on large-scale 
combat operations through developing interoperability among countries and increasing the 
capacity of select security forces units. SOF has its equivalent host of exercises to 
compliment this strategic approach of engaging with security partners, as highlighted in 
Europe with the Trojan Footprint series of exercises that develops relationships between 
NATO SOF units from multiple countries.54 
The U.S. Army recognized its inability to fully describe the contemporary operating 
environment and developed the concept of multi-domain operations.55 Its publication, The 
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations in 2028 describes in detail how the U.S. Army will 
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52 Frazier, Derrick V, and J. Wesley Hutto. “The Socialization of Military Power: Security 
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“fight and win” in conflicts of the future that will require understanding and operating 
throughout the multiple domains of warfare. It goes further to describe limited aspects of 
the civil component of the physical domain and gives a short range of activities that can 
contribute to operational success for unit operations in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), 
such as intelligence gathering through civil networks, countering enemy SOF capabilities 
that assumedly could be found to be embedded in the civil population of a contested space, 
and engaging civil authorities in the tactical support area (TSA).56 However, these limited 
descriptions do not capture the complex, and often chaotic conditions of the operating 
environment that the U.S. Army often finds itself in. It goes on to describe the various areas 
of a war or conflict, that range from the Deep Fires Area to the tactical support area. While 
its helpful to conceptualize the contested space of the future in layers, this may not be 
useful when trying to develop a strategy to compete in the complex operating environment 
the U.S. military currently finds itself in that will only grow in complexity into the future. 
One scholar details this new age American military that has tried and, according to her, 
failed at blending civil and military capabilities as it continues to grow in its scope, and the 
problems it deals with outside of its traditional mandate of all things defense.57 
E. APPROACHES TO NEW AGE COMPETITION 
Insights from historical cases help inform the future. For example, as described in 
Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War with Robert 
Strassler and Richard Crawley, Brasidas operated much like a special operations team 
during the Peloponnesian war to leverage multiple elements of DIMEFIL to break apart 
the networks of the Athenian Alliance and bring them over to Spartan Control.58 Early 
examples such as Brasidas’s operations show that military leaders in the past have dealt 
with this issue of applying the optimal proportions of DIMEFIL at the ideal time.  
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Many have postulated on the role of SOF in great power competition and potentially 
large-scale combat operations. DeRosa et al. discuss the potential roles for SOF in great 
power competition in “SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition”; however, the authors 
do not discuss how much lethality will be required for competition.59 Robert Toguchi and 
Michael Krivdo do talk about lethality in The Competitive Advantage, which discusses 
potential combat operations in the era of great power competition.60 The application of 
force and the decision of when and where to employ force is an inherently risky endeavor, 
and Against the Gods highlights how this risk could contribute to USSOCOM’s potential 
risk assessment of lethal action against the time it takes to conduct a successful influence 
campaign.61 
Civil resistance offers an approach that could be potentially used by SOF to 
compete in the civil domain while striking a balance in DIMEFIL, especially in a country 
or region under repression. Kinetic actions in resistance movements are limited by the 
capabilities of the network; therefore, if SOF wishes to eventually leverage the civil domain 
to affect lethal action developing robust networks inside of the civil domain should be 
prioritized.62 The 2020 Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) developed by Otto Fiala 
discusses potential implications of DIMEFIL on the outcomes of a resistance movement 
supported by the U.S. 63 ROC addresses DIMEFIL only as structural elements of the 
operating environment, and discusses the actions that must occur at the tactical level to 
enable a resistance movement without elaborating on how elements of DIMEFIL can 
support each other in a resistance environment. Lethal activities also are a small portion of 
overall resistance activities and are only possible with the logistics and resources provided 
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to the movement through support from the population and outside benefactors such as in 
the case of the French Resistance, the Allies. As a resistance movement is not the 
equivalent of a professional military force and is often pitted against oppressive security 
forces trained in counterinsurgency operations, the underground must be selective in its 
targeting of its opposition. When resistance movements do decide to act in a lethal manner, 
such actions must be assessed for their strategic contributions to the overall campaign.  
Popular support is paramount in running an effective resistance movement.64 Using 
influence and information in a targeted campaign can build support for the movement, 
develop support zones for resistance members, counter occupier narratives and disrupt 
occupiers attempts at pacifying the population. An influence campaign can also help the 
resistance blend in with the population and reduce chances of detection. Additionally, an 
influence campaign can encourage the regular population that may not actively be resisting 
to find passive ways to resist occupation and impose cost on the regime. Influence 
campaigns are also risky because they require either a lot of resources or a lot of influential 
people to reinforce messaging. The more of the population that resists, the more cost is 
imposed on occupiers making it more and more difficult to maintain legitimacy and 
governance of an occupation. Having looked at past approaches to competition and conflict 
in the civil domain, research in this thesis focuses on applying the DIMEFIL model in 
analyzing each of the following case studies. 
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IV. CASE STUDY #1: COLOMBIA, 2000–2020 
A. INTRODUCTION 
USSOF maintains a long history of being involved in Colombia, dating back to the 
1950s when U.S. Army Rangers trained a new elite unit in the Colombian Army called 
Lanceros.65 This early engagement by USSOF opened the door for continued involvement 
over the course of the remainder of the 20th century and well into the 21st century. One 
interesting perspective on Colombia is how a minimal presence, specifically from SOF, 
has allowed Colombia to become one of the premier security partners of the U.S. in Latin 
America.66 “At any given time, there are more than 100 USSOF members in country. We 
have been here so long that we know the country inside and out,” Lt. Col. Scott Morley 
stated in an interview with Special Warfare magazine for its Summer 2018 issue.67This 
small presence has certainly been the preferred approach of current and past 
administrations to maintain popular support from the people of the United States, which 
was exacerbated in May 2020 when President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of 
50 soldiers from a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to help with the changing 
counter-narcotics mission in Colombia.68 Looking at this specific case of how USSOF has 
operated in Colombia and engaged heavily with civil components of the environment of 
Colombia can give insights as to how an effective strategy for USSOF can make similar 
investments at a lower cost around the globe in support of great power competition. 
Plan Colombia has been an instrumental step for moving Colombia towards long 
term stability. News outlet Washington Post described the USG undertaking in Colombia 
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best, “After 16 years and $10 billion, the once-controversial security aid package is 
celebrated today by many Republicans and Democrats in Congress as one of the top U.S. 
foreign policy achievements of the 21st century.”69 The case of U.S. involvement in 
Colombia may help illustrate how USSOF can maintain a relatively low presence over 
sustained periods of time in supporting a whole-of-government approach, while leveraging 
elements of the civil component to achieve strategic gains. Investment by SOF in Colombia 
made up a relatively smaller package when compared to investments from the rest of the 
USG. Colombia is a useful model to consider how a limited U.S. military presence can and 
should maximize all elements of DIMEFIL to achieve its strategic objectives. 
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
The U.S. has taken a diversified approach to not only improving its relations with 
Colombia, but also helping stymie the development of the drug trade and increasing the 
capacity of Colombia to defend its sovereignty both internally and externally from a variety 
of threats. This consistent presence of USSOF over time accompanied with investments in 
other elements of DIMEFIL such as economic and law enforcement has created conditions 
for Colombia to progress with some stability into the 21st century. Recent U.S. 
involvement in Colombia has primarily been focused on providing military assistance in 
the form of military training for its regular military units and its special operations units. 
Colombia has undergone significant force structure changes that have allowed it to adapt 
to the ever-changing security environment it faces internally, such as its long history 
fighting the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and externally, with 
the consistent threat of Venezuela on its eastern border.  
C. CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
Looking at this case study, the pre-determined evaluation criteria will be used to 
identify how the approach was crafted and what proportion was applied to each of the 
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elements of DIMEFIL. Each element of national power will be evaluated and pointing out 
successes and failures of how SOF integrates capabilities across the DIMEFIL spectrum to 
engage the civil domain. 
1. Diplomatic 
The United States has maintained a diplomatic presence in Colombia since 1822.70 
The U.S. approach to its relations with Colombia represents a whole-of-government 
approach, as well as encouraging Colombia to take a similar approach to the challenges it 
has faced in the last 10 years to include its counter-narcotic efforts and dealing with the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) crisis.71 At the outset of Plan Colombia, by 2003 
the U.S. Embassy to Colombia was the largest U.S. embassy in the world, as nearly 5,000 
diplomats and contractors supported diplomatic efforts in country.72 The positioning of 
key personnel and forces who work directly with embassy staff has been a critical 
component of USSOF involvement with the diplomatic element in Colombia. Key 
personnel include the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and other SOF members 
from the Special Operations Command Forward (SOCFWD) who report directly to Theater 
Special Operations Command South (TSOC).73 This forward positioning of personnel 
who can help articulate the status of SOF to embassy leadership has helped enable better 
coordination and more fluid operations that achieve great effects. 
One of those success stories was a 2008 pseudo-operation that was coordinated by 
elements from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, USSOF, and members of the Colombian 
military to free fifteen hostages that had been taken by the FARC in Operation Jaque. A 
pseudo-operation is one in which government forces infiltrate insurgent controlled units by 
imitating of insurgent actors.74 Leading up to the operation, the Colombians approached 
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the U.S. Ambassador at the time, William Brownfield with an audacious plan to execute 
the pseudo-operation.75 After much careful review of the operation, the U.S. Ambassador 
presented the option to the U.S. President, George W. Bush, who after consulting with his 
National Security Council, approved the operation. 76  Throughout the planning and 
execution of this operation, USSOF, Colombian military, Colombian government, and U.S. 
State Department personnel worked side by side till mission completion. The operation 
highlighted the high functioning ability for multiple elements of both the USG, the 
Colombian government, military forces from both countries and even private organizations 
to work together across the DIMEFIL spectrum to achieve one objective: the release of 
hostages.77 Even more so, as this was a Colombian planned and executed operation, it 
showcased how effective U.S. military assistance to include SOF training had developed 
the Colombian military to a point to be able to carry out this mission.  
2. Information 
Often, SOF work directly with both USG agencies and not just collaborate on 
operations but enable those agencies operations, as security is often a limiting factor in 
determining where they can execute operations. This ground up approach has created 
opportunities for SOF to directly impact remote areas of Colombia that have been prone to 
insurgent activity. For example, psychological operations teams have operated in Colombia 
for several years in concert with other USSOF forces. In previous years, psychological 
operations (PSYOPs) worked to support demobilization programs and counter FARC 
information campaigns that directly targeted children for recruitment.78 PSYOPs team 
found ways to support interagency efforts by linking their programming with existing 
programs such as the “Yo Soy” campaign which focused on supporting the hopes and 
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dreams of families, tying their messaging back to a secure government that could prevent 
their children from being recruited by insurgents.79 
3. Military 
One of the key components that has set military operations apart in Colombia from 
other areas of responsibility in both Latin America and around the globe has been a 
significant engagement with civil society. Civil Affairs (CA) units have been persistently 
engaged in Colombia since the 1990s. 80  This engagement has focused on engaging 
Colombian law enforcement, government agencies, non-governmental organizations 
operating throughout Colombia, and professional services such as doctors and engineers. 
USSOF, to include U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PSYOPs, helped develop a civil affairs 
and PSYOPs capability within the Colombian army itself so it can engage with and support 
its own people in the conduct of counter-narcotics operations or when battling the FARC.81 
Foreign military financing in Colombia (FMF) has hovered between $53-25 million 
dollars from 2009 - 2017.82 While some might argue that is significant spending, it pales 
in comparison to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq which collectively made up 19% 
of the total expenditure of security assistance programs in FY 2016.83 While the military 
assistance supplied to Colombia over the last several decades certainly has been helpful in 
improving its security situation, it is reasonable to deduce that this approach to how and in 
what ways military assistance has been employed, specifically USSOF as it has made up a 
majority of the military assistance provided to Colombia, shaped the improving outcome 
in Colombia. 
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Economic aid from the United States to Colombia has continued to grow since 
2016, reaching 187.3 million dollars in total economic and development support to the 
country. 84  This economic support has translated into an increase in economic 
competitiveness for Colombia, moving up to 61st place in the world according to the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). Looking at the local level, a common misconception 
is the simple solution of increasing economic and development aid to address assumed 
“root causes” of conflict including social mobility or economic opportunity. The case of 
Colombia suggests this is not necessarily the case, as significant economic aid has been 
poured into the country, yet violence has persisted to include the FARC splinter group, the 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the determined narco-terrorist groups. 
However, what has become clear and is an effective strategy in the case of Colombia has 
been the combining of effects, and employment of multiple elements to achieve security 
objectives, after the securing of a population.  
Dollars can come in, go out, and their true effect may never be truly measured. 
Foreign Direct Investment increased from 11.5 billion dollars to 14.5 billion dollars from 
2019 to 2020, albeit mostly into extractive industries such as oil and mining.85 This foreign 
direct investment, when measured with other investments specifically from the U.S. 
Government totaling 418.1 million dollars in 2019, shows that dollars matter and using 
incentives and making investments with finances can shape the outcome of policy in a 
country. For example, one of those programs supported by U.S. financial funding includes 
the Colombian Government’s Agency for Reintegration. This U.S. funded and Colombian 
run agency has, “assisted the reintegration efforts of approximately 26,000 demobilized 
former combatants to date, and works to provide education, vocational training, grants for 
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microbusiness projects, health care, and support finding employment opportunities.”86 
Additionally, funding that supports lines of effort not just in the security realm seem to 
contribute overall long-term improvement to  the security situation, as other problems 
begin to be resolved, such as two cases presented here of children being recruited, or 
demobilization efforts. 
5. Financial 
The impacts of financial components in the operational environment are certainly 
among the toughest to assess with regard to the overall contribution of efforts to effect  
change in the security situation, despite the USG’s ability to track relevant financial data. 
The FARC have long used coca production to fund revolutionary activities. However, 
using illicit goods as a source of funding creates financial challenges that the FARC solved 
by laundering a majority of its income it received from protecting coca farmers and 
enabling drug cartel operations.87 Research into U.S. Treasury operations in Colombia did 
not identify many specifics for analysis, especially since it was difficult to identify what, 
if any, overlaps existed between SOF operations and Treasury operations. U.S. Treasury 
operations have historically supported reducing the availability of financial assets to drug 
cartel leadership and associated entities. Treasury has often sanctioned specific members 
of an organization or an entire organization, which prevents financial assets from being 
leveraged by that organization, as in the case of Pedro Luis Zuleta Noscue, who the U.S. 
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned in October of 2018.88 
Noscue also had ties to the FARC, which shows how Treasury operations can supplement 
broader goals and support other elements of DIMEFIL beyond cracking down on narco-
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traffickers; and investments garner the best return when programs are linked across 
agencies.  
6. Intelligence 
Intelligence undoubtedly drives any military operation; but how can intelligence 
impact the civil society? In a complex environment like Colombia, interested parties are 
always competing for control of their area and looking to advance their agenda, which 
creates tough dilemmas for Colombian security forces and their USSOF advisors. One 
collaborative intelligence initiative was the establishment of an interagency intelligence 
fusion center at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. 89  As Spencer, author of Lessons from 
Colombia’s Road to Recovery, 1982–2010 puts it, “The sharing of intelligence among the 
police, the armed forces, and the civilian intelligence agencies has been a key component 
of Colombia’s ability to locate, kill, or capture enemy HVTs.”90 
Consider again the case of Operation Jaqué. After years of intelligence activities, 
all that work came to head when the helicopters that had Colombian operatives dressed as 
news crew launched in 2008 to free the fifteen hostages currently being held by the FARC. 
Colombians often would cite some of their most valuable training and intelligence being 
one of them. 91  Clearly, the Colombians had developed their intelligence capability, 
recognizing its value, most likely with U.S. support, and effectively used it to support other 
elements of DIMEFIL as it engaged the civil society in the conduct of operations through 
its civil affairs and psychological operations units and others. More importantly, USSOF 
and the Colombians alike found an optimal balance between leveraging intelligence to 
target insurgent leadership, while recognizing that lethality was not the most important 
operation. 
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7. Law Enforcement 
Not only do SOF partner with Colombian military units, but they also step in to 
work closely with and develop the capabilities of police units.92 This extends beyond 
individual unit engagement and training. Capabilities developed during training from 
USSOF have enabled the Colombians to establish a significant sensitive sight exploitation 
capability that bolstered the Colombians ability to develop cases against various criminal 
elements.93 Special Forces and Navy SEAL units have trained extensively with members 
of the Armada Nacional de Colombia which set up a joint task force by working with police 
units in the city of Tumaco, an origin point for significant narco-trafficking. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
One key takeaway from U.S. involvement in Colombia was the use of Special 
Operations Forces. USSOF have not only been able to advise and train Colombian forces, 
but because of the relationships they have with elements such as the embassy and USAID, 
they can rapidly leverage other elements of national power when needed as the situation 
changes. One could argue that more forces are required to cover a greater portion of the 
country, but SOF’s limited involvement has proven this is not true. SOF’s investment in 
Colombian civil affairs and psychological operations units has clearly been a good 
investment, as now these units can go out and engage with the Colombian population and 
civil society without having to rely on their U.S. counterparts.  
U.S. economic and financial aid has also made a significant difference in the 
trajectory of Colombia. It appears that financial aid, when coupled with the appropriate  
amount of military assistance can be effective in resolving stability issues in a country. 
Colombia’s intelligence capabilities have most likely continued to mature as the country’s 
security forces grow in their ability to now export security outside of their own country.94 
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This case has also shown that security does not always have to come from military forces, 
and police forces often have a significant role to play in improving conditions. While U.S. 
forces have engaged with police forces on a large scale in the past, such as in the cases of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears that for Colombia, limited engagement with the police has 
supported additional efforts to engage with military forces to improve the whole security 
situation.  
While security will always need to be addressed, a balanced approach is key. 
Colombia has consistently conducted high value targeting over the years to eliminate 
insurgent leaders, but this has proven to be ineffective when conducted alone according to 
Moyar et al. in Persistent engagement in Colombia.95 They argue that Colombia did not 
have enough forces to effectively counter the insurgent problem. Looking back over the 
evidence from this case, I assess that it was the coagulation of compounding affects across 
DIMEFIL that created conditions for a more stable Colombia: 
• Integrated personnel at the U.S. Embassy from SOF and other agencies 
that could consistently collaborate and coordinate operations. 
• A limited but purposeful U.S. military presence, with clear objectives. 
• A robust economic package that complimented military efforts by 
bolstering the Colombian economy and providing alternatives to becoming 
involved with the FARC or other malign organizations. 
• Using intelligence to support operations and not simply drive high value 
targeting of insurgent leadership. 
• Leveraging competent police forces when available to contribute to 
security efforts. 
This lends itself to believe that there must be another way to contribute to security, 
while improving conditions in stability with limited resources. In the current post-FARC 
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peace deal area, splinter groups and factions have rose to the top to continue the revolution 
against the Colombian government.96 The future of the peace deal remains uncertain, but 
undoubtedly Colombia’s capacity and capability to contend with future instability has been 
forever improved due to the assistance it has received from the U.S. 
E. FINDINGS 
Clearly, the USG has made consistent and consequential investments into the future 
of Colombia across the DIMEFIL spectrum. These investments have added up and allowed 
Colombia to become a South American success story over the last decade, gaining much 
attention on the world stage after the culmination of peace talks between the Colombian 
government and the FARC.97 Importantly, the investments the U.S. has made in terms of 
troops and forces has been relatively small, and USSOF has maintained a small footprint 
in Colombia for decades. Every case is different, but several lessons emerge from this case 
that apply to the current and future security environment. 
It is likely that the U.S. will continue to develop its relationship with Colombia well 
into the future, and only time will tell how much involvement from SOF will be required. 
One thing Colombia has shown is how intricately linked the civil environment is to the 
security environment, and that both must be assessed and engaged with concertedly. The 
advent of technology, information warfare, and changing economic landscape will only 
intensify the need for the U.S. to assess and engage the civil environment in Colombia and 
other areas into the future. For the next case study, the Greek Civil War, research addresses 
an instance where lethality was necessary and adequate in defeating an insurgency. 
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V. CASE STUDY #2: GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1945–1949 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Greek Civil War of 1945–1949 provides an example of how conventional 
forces, military advising, and economic assistance can prove useful in shaping the outcome 
of a conflict. This was a case with little interaction between U.S. military advisors and the 
Greek population. Engagements of American military advisors primarily focused on 
engaging their Greek military counterparts. The U.S. State Department focused on 
engaging the Greek government, and coupled with U.S. military assistance, proved to be 
an effective whole-of-government approach. One of the key strategic mishaps of the Greek 
insurgents, who were backed by the Soviets, was transitioning from a guerrilla war to 
conventional war too early and attempting to fight a force that was well backed with 
conventional military assistance. This case shows that placing an emphasis on the 
population and engaging in the civil domain is not always necessary. Sometimes brute 
force, dollars, and guns is a winning strategy. 
Understanding the changes in strategies and approaches in this key case could give 
insights to how USSOCOM can identify the correct approach at the ideal time. This case 
also helps identify how a primary conventional military assistance mission affected the 
outcome of this conflict, as the U.S. continues to grow its SFAB capability. Perhaps SOF 
are not always required, and possibly there is a cost trade off difference associated when 
going with a lower-cost footprint such as SOF vice versa a larger more robust footprint as 
conventional forces. This case shows a relatively small U.S. conventional footprint that 
accompanied military and economic funding assistance. The Greek Civil War was one of 
America’s forays into irregular warfare in the 20th century and shaped the development of 
doctrine, training, and equipment following the resolution of the conflict.98 American 
military advisors in Greece advised the Greek army in its employment of WWII tactics of 
combined arms maneuver, close air support, and mobility; reinforcing their hypothesis that 
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this was the most efficient way of war, regardless of the type of warfare an adversary may 
seek to employ, setting the stage for the eventual challenges of Vietnam. 
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
As World War II was winding down, and German forces had been entrenched in 
Greece, the Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós (ELAS), which stands for the 
National People’s Liberation Army, started an insurgency to expel the Axis invaders and 
eventually overthrow the existing Greek government.99 As the Germans were pushed out 
and the Allies moved in, primarily the British, the Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (KKE) 
began to gain control over territory with plans to overthrow the existing Greek 
government.100 This uprising was backed by Joseph Stalin as he pledged military and 
economic support to the pro-communist insurgents, hoping to help spread the ideology of 
communism in to a new state.101 With the Allies primarily focused on ending the war, not 
much support was available immediately to help the Greek government overcome the 
insurgents. However, as WWII ended and the Axis powers surrendered, support began 
flowing into Greece.102 The UK and U.S. both recognized the threat that the Soviet Union 
and communism posed to Western Europe and pledged support to the pro-west Greek 
government. Throughout 1946 and into 1947, the insurgents focused on a guerrilla war, 
relying on safe havens across the border in the neighboring countries of Albania, 
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.103  
American intervention started in 1947 when President Truman approached 
Congress with a plan to provide $300 million in aid to Greece. Support continued to grow 
with the creation of Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) which 
oversaw U.S. military advising in Greece. In early 1948 General James Van Fleet was 
named commander of the JUSMAPG and dispatched to take command of the advising 
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mission.104 The goal of JUSMAPG was to enable American advisors to control the waging 
of the war against the guerrillas.105 Over the course of 1947 to 1948, the insurgents 
effectively disrupted Greek National Army (GNA) operations. After JUSMAPG was 
established and began advising, American advisors helped shape the organization and 
training of GNA to resemble a more conventional modern force for that time because that 
is what they knew how to do extremely well, having just fought in WWII. JUSMAPG 
advised the Greeks to move away from special units and focus on developing their standing 
army to be numerically and tactically superior in terms of personnel and firepower.106 This 
worked out to the GNA’s advantage as the insurgents began a shift away from waging 
guerrilla warfare and began meeting the GNA in open engagements, which ultimately led 
to their defeat. The insurgents simply could not overpower the GNA with their significant 
backing from the U.S. To add to this point, in 1949 Tito and Stalin diverged in aligned 
interests, which resulted in the insurgents losing support from Yugoslavia, forcing the 
insurgents to mainly operate in the mountainous regions of southern Albania. While the 
complicated position of the insurgents having to rely on safe havens across the border was 
not critical to their defeat, the introduction of air power and targeting of supply and 
infiltration routes that insurgents had been using for most of the war enabled a decisive end 
to insurgents’ ability to gain momentum in the later years of the civil war. The massing of 
firepower both air and artillery coupled with employment of methodical clearing of 
insurgent strongholds brought about a decisive end to the war. U.S. advisors learned that 
their approach of overwhelming military assistance that was developed up to that point 
from the American experience in WWII, was successful at a relatively low cost which will 
be elaborated further in the case study analysis. 
C. CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
Analysis for this case will focus on attempting to identify what key factors across 
the DIMEFIL spectrum led to the eventual defeat of the communist insurgents, principally 
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from the viewpoint of American support and American investments. Additionally, analysis 
will focus on how and if any engagement within the civil domain occurred and to what 
extent it impacted the trajectory of the conflict. Perspectives will be given on how the 
insurgents conversely operated within the civil domain and assessments will be made to 
determine to what extent this helped or hurt their cause.  
1.  Diplomatic 
Once the Americans intervened, one of the challenges of a high level of financial 
military support was creating a sense of limitless support from the USG and American 
people due to the strategic geopolitical context of the American entrance into the civil war: 
First is the issue of leverage. Since the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine, the United States put the Greek Civil War in terms of being part 
of a greater East-West conflict. The Greeks perceived that the United States 
was fully committed to winning the war. Therefore, the Greeks believed 
that the U.S. would provide ever-increasing funds or would send American 
combat troops to Greece if the rebels appeared to be close to final victory. 
Greek soldiers, from the lowest to highest rank, did not feel the need to be 
aggressive.107 
Essentially by pledging their support, the Americans may have counterintuitively 
conveyed a sense of safety to the Greeks, that they would have come to their aid no matter 
how dire the situation became. Conversely, one could argue that this actually reinforced 
the American position and demonstrated a high amount of resolve to reassure its ally that 
they were committed to supporting the Greek government. Government competence is also 
key, as the Americans learned while advising the Greeks that if they did not enable good 
governance on part of the Greeks, the population would turn to the insurgents for the 
governance needs.108 
Since by this point, modern USSOF had not quite fully come to fruition, it is hard 
to evaluate how SOF would have impacted the mission in Greece. One could speculate that 
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USSOF would have contributed greatly to the mission, with a focused training plan to 
increase special capabilities in GNA forces, and tying well with diplomatic efforts. Yet, it 
is unclear to what extent coordination of State Department initiatives were synchronized 
with U.S. military assistance initiatives, and if Van Fleet simply had “carte blanche” 
authorization to do what it took to enable the GNA to root out the insurgents. In the 
diplomatic realm, it is hard to discern how much more coordination would have gained the 
net sum for the American interest in Greece. Perhaps coordination was in fact excellent, 
due to the limited military presence, and limitations on using only advisors instead of 
deploying operational units such as infantry and other maneuver elements. 
2. Information 
The information campaign that the Greek government pursued could be 
characterized as coercive, persuasive, and legalistic. The Greek government used 
psychological operations to put pressure on insurgents and erode its support from the 
public. Aircraft were used before ground operations to drop leaflets targeting Greek 
People’s Liberation Army or DAS fighters to surrender.109 These leaflets were followed 
up with offers of amnesty extended to the DAS. 110 Despite well documented use of 
psychological operations in WWII, these leaflet drops signified USG early attempts at 
PSYOPs in limited wars such as this one. Coupled with police forces crackdown on KKE 
and DAS sympathizers, the Government’s campaign of repeatedly and publicly 
condemning the DAS created an effective information campaign that eroded the KKE’s 
legitimacy over time. There is a significant difference between creating campaigns when a 
whole nation is the enemy as was the case with Nazi Germany, versus a resistance 
movement that has sprung up in occupied territory that receives sympathy from a 
significant amount of the population as in Greece.  
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What makes this case different than other cases presented in this thesis is how 
heavily American investments in the GNA contributed to the defeat of the communist 
insurgent group. American investment came primarily in the form of military aid, material, 
and advising that shaped how the GNA organized and began fighting back against the 
insurgents.  
JUSMAPG faced numerous challenges in advising the GNA which lacked 
established doctrine and force organization comparable to that of a modern force of that 
time. Cable describes the American experience in Greece in summation, “JUSMAPG saw 
the Greek Civil War to be simply a war and, like any war, amenable to simple direct 
military resolution.”111 The GNA primarily consisted of 3 Field Divisions, 4 Mountain 
Divisions, and a special operations type unit called the LOK, or Lochoi Oreinōn 
Katadromōn meaning mountain raiding company.112 The Americans focused on limiting 
the missions of the LOK, a British trained special operations unit, to raiding and deep 
reconnaissance missions as they were an effective force in the conflict and GNA 
commanders would rather employ a force that achieved results than their less trained GNA 
counterparts.113 This was the challenge JUSMAPG faced, how to effectively train up the 
GNA to a capable level to begin effectively challenging the DAS in the countryside, which 
could be done quickly.  
Airpower and artillery played a significant role as well in the evolution of the 
conflict and ultimate defeat of the DAS. Over time, the buildup of fires capabilities in the 
GNA enabled them to support ground forces with effective fire power to the point where 
the DAS simply could not overcome this advantage. As the conflict progressed, GNA units 
became more effective and systematic in the employment of their forces because of 
American advising, which created opportunities for successful operations penetrating deep 
into DAS controlled territory of the mountainous regions of Northern Greece. Successful 
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sweeps of DAS strongholds forced the DAS to recoup and regenerate forces in their safe 
havens in bordering countries, which created the time and space for the Greek government 
to establish legitimate governance in previously DAS controlled areas. 
4. Economic 
The Greek Civil War provided an early opportunity for the U.S. to execute the 
Truman Doctrine, which pledged $300 - $400 million in economic and military support to 
Greece as they fought the ELAS in the civil war. 114 According to a 1947 report to 
Congress, the economic package sent to Greece in 1947 totaled $146,500,000 in July of 
that year which was then reduced to $123,500,000 in December, denoting a significant shift 
in the overall package to presumably increase military assistance.115 With this economic 
assistance, the American mission to Greece advised the Greek government in the allocation 
of funds which “assisted in improvements in the internal distribution of supplies and, 
through its advice and guidance, has stimulated progress in fiscal, budgetary, and 
organizational reforms within the. Government”.116 This report to Congress illustrated the 
changing security conditions in Greece due to the increasing capabilities of the insurgents 
and recommended to bolster military support in the campaign. 
5. Financial 
Before evaluating the financial element of Greece, it is important to note that this 
case study took place before modern financial systems were developed. Financial 
intelligence was relatively low, albeit Greek government programs sought to decrease 
financial support for the resistance from populace sympathizers but tracking such support 
during these times would have been difficult. Had modern threat finance intelligence and 
other financial practices existed at the time, and if SOF were integrated into such 
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operations, SOF could have helped identify financial information to help separate the 
populace from the insurgents, deny insurgent funding, and target suspected insurgent 
leaders through financial transactions. 
Greece was in a tough spot financially following WWII as it entered the civil war. 
From the previously referenced report to congress, it shows that financial assistance and 
advising focused on assisting the Greeks overcome high inflation and develop an internal 
budget.117 The goal of this research was not to identify specific financial situations that 
were dealt with American and foreign support. More so, this research suggests that often 
in cases such as these a wholistic approach is optimal, and that military assistance alone 
was not the only factor in contributing to a success in supporting the Greek government. 
Also particular to this case was how it appears after research that military advisors 
primarily focused on advising their military counterparts, and economic and diplomatic 
assistance was primarily provided via the State department and the U.S. diplomatic mission 
to Greece. This shows a significant difference in how the U.S. and particularly SOF has 
acted in recent conflicts to attempt to work closely with other U.S. agencies to best allocate 
resources such as economic and development assistance to areas that most need it in 
developing countries. 
6. Intelligence 
Intelligence efforts of the U.S., the Greek government, and GNA were not made 
clear in this research. The insurgents were identified as having a significant and robust 
intelligence network of approximately 15,000 active and 750,00 passive supporters in the 
form of the Yiafka, the DAS intelligence and collection cells that were operating throughout 
the country.118 From the outset, the insurgents appeared to hold an intelligence advantage 
that the GNA and government would have to overcome either through the buildup of forces 
and firepower or other means such as winning over the population. American military 
assistance most likely enabled the GNA to develop its forces to the point where the 
insurgent intelligence advantage was no longer valid as they simply could not overcome 
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the GNA’s growing force and firepower advantages. As the GNA and police forces began 
working together, they were able to begin isolating insurgent support zones by arresting 
suspected Yiafka members to deny insurgent pre-battle intelligence and prevent them from 
avoiding surprise GNA attacks.119 
7. Law Enforcement 
The Greek government made an effective use of its law and law enforcement 
capabilities to support the overall effort to defeat the DAS. Military assistance from the 
U.S. was very explicit and laid out through research, however it is unclear if any elements 
of the U.S. military or other agencies engaged with any Greek law enforcement. Suspected 
KKE would be arrested before GNA operations.120 The Greek government by the end of 
the war had arrested thousands of Greeks who were charged with subversion.121 It appears 
this strategy helped the GNA separate and isolate insurgent support from the rest of the 
population as it conducted sweeping operations towards the north. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The U.S. made consistent investments over time in the form of the military advisor 
and material assistance, and economic support that it provided to the Greek government. 
The GNA was able to develop to the point where they could begin pushing north in 
sweeping operations to clear insurgent strongholds, thanks in part to JUSMAPG’s advising 
efforts. Airpower and artillery support proved to be critical as GNA forces pushed further 
north in the later parts of the war. Timing also played a key role in the success of the GNA. 
The communist leadership pushed heavily on Markos, commander of the DAS, to 
transition to a conventional fight and meet the GNA forces in open battle towards the end 
of the conflict that played right into the hand of the GNA and JUSMAPG. Had Markos 
chosen to maintain a guerrilla warfare strategy, as he assessed would be most effective 
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until the Greek governments resolve was weak enough, this could have changed the course 
of the war. 
Failures always exist in every conflict, as the nature of warfare is variable and never 
the same. JUSMAPG believed the solution to the conflict was developing the capabilities 
of the GNA, creating a modern conventional fighting force capable of waging an effective 
counterinsurgency campaign against the insurgents. The USG made a significant fiscal 
expenditure in supporting the Greek government, of nearly $1 Billion, of which a majority 
went to properly arming the GNA. The ultimate failure in this case for the Americans was 
learning that overwhelming firepower and a well-equipped and well-trained army can 
defeat an insurgency under any conditions and making an assumption that numerical 
superiority will always win. The U.S. would later find this assumption is not always 
accurate, as was the case in future conflicts such as Vietnam. Specifically, the Viet Cong, 
with the support of the North Vietnamese Army, effectively held out long enough for U.S. 
support to leave, allowing them to achieve their political ends. Also, the Greek dependency 
on American economic aid and military support is evident. Without such support, one could 
see an alternate outcome where the communists would have overthrown the nationalist 
government and installed a pro-communist government that would have aligned with the 
USSR. The Greek government along with its U.S. advisors placed a high premium on 
military support which dismissed any concerns of the population and established a theory 
of victory that crushing the insurgency with overwhelming firepower was inevitable with 
time. While this approach is feasible for a short campaign such as this one, other cases such 
as Afghanistan has shown that overwhelming military capabilities cannot always win the 
conflict. The social, cultural, and political dynamics of a conflict must be understood 
holistically to determine the optimal blend of civil and military capabilities across the 
DIMEFIL spectrum for any theory of victory for conflicts of the future. While this case 
can be viewed from many perspectives, the assistance provided by the U.S. undoubtedly 
contributed to overall mission success. However, this case is the exception and not the rule, 




The most significant investment the U.S. made in this conflict was in the form of 
economic and military aid. The military advisor package was relatively small when 
compared to other conflicts, coming off the heels of WWII and prior to the significant 
contributions and sacrifices made in the Korean War. Given these investments, the U.S. 
made good use of its advantages—financial support with its strong economy, the new 
resolve at home to prevent the spread of communism, and the employment of military 
advisors and material from its conventional arsenal that was still at its prime following 
WWII. 
Assumptions could be made as to the overall effectiveness of the aid packages, but 
ultimately the communist insurgency was defeated, and America achieved its strategic 
political goal. What is not evident in this case is how the civil domain was engaged. It 
appears that in this case overwhelming military support, training, and fire power in the 
form of air support and artillery provided a significant advantage that overpowered the 
capabilities of the insurgents. The Greek government was able to leverage the growing 
military capabilities of its military force, while diminishing the intelligence capabilities of 
the Yiafka that provided significant support to the DAS, accompanied by legal capabilities 
to isolate insurgents from the populace. Along with economic and development assistance 
aimed at improving the economic situation, the Greek government along with its support 
from both the U.S. mission to Greece and JUSMAPG, were able to increase the legitimacy 
of the Greek government which in the long term enabled the defeat of the insurgents. In 
this case, outside support mattered. The Truman Doctrine provided a way to bolster the 
capacity of the Greek government militarily and economically, which far surpassed the 
limited support the insurgents received from neighboring countries and the USSR. What 
can be pulled from this case is that in certain instances, especially when the geopolitical 
situation includes a broader context for how the conflict is to be viewed on the global stage, 
that outside support can make the difference of success or failure of a government that is 
embroiled in a conflict. The next case study, U.S. intervention in the Philippines, will 
evaluate how U.S. assistance helped Philippine efforts to defeat an insurgency. 
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VI. CASE STUDY #3: THE PHILIPPINES, 2001–2020 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following 9/11 attacks, President George Bush declared the war on terror.122 That 
War declaration kickstarted a series of events that included deployment of SOF to the 
Philippines to participate in a Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission to counter the 
growing threat of the terrorist group known as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 123  U.S. 
assistance to the Philippines initially surged to 1,300 troops in 2002, with a consistent 
presence in later years of 500–600 troops.124 The Philippines is a successful case of 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) due to U.S. intervention.  
The case of USSOF assistance in the Philippines was chosen due to the diverse 
nature of SOF missions that were executed throughout the campaign. SOF missions 
included operational level planning assistance, civil military operations (CMO), 
intelligence support operations, police special action forces (SAF) training, and training 
support to the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG).125 Special operations 
training notwithstanding, engagement in the Philippines focused on specific elements of 
the civil environment with the overall goal of reducing terrorist strength and influence. 
Additionally, in their study, U.S. Special Operations in the Philippines, 2001–2014, RAND 
identifies three data points that were tracked and analyzed to determine the effectiveness 
of U.S. operations in reducing terrorism: number of enemy initiated attacks, number of 
ASG militants and polls measuring support for ASG among the populace. In each of these 
metrics, RAND found an overall reduction over time, leading to the conclusion that USSOF 
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intervention in the Philippines reduced violence and reduced the spread of violent 
extremism.126 
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
During the 1990s, as Al Qaida began to develop into a persistent threat to the U.S., 
it also inspired other radical Islamic groups to take action and fight for the radical view of 
Islamic life. As ASG grew in the Philippines, it began to receive support and funding from 
Osama Bin Laden, surging to over 2,000 members in the year 2000, conducting 36 attacks 
in 1995 and 29 attacks in 1999.127 While senior U.S. officials only started to take interest 
in the ASG until pre and post 9/11 attacks, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group which 
is forward based in Okinawa, Japan took notice early on. 128  Then as ASG began 
kidnapping Americans, U.S. interest escalated.129 According to Rand, in September of 
2000 after the activity levels began being noticed by more senior members of the USG, 
and planning team was dispatched to meet with the Philippines government and military: 
In September 2000, a USPACOM planning team led by ADM Dennis C. 
Blair with members of SOCPAC, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group 
(JUSMAG) to the Republic of the Philippines, and the 1st SFG (Airborne) 
met with Philippine military and government officials in Manila to begin 
planning for an extensive mobile training team mission under Title 22 
Chapter 22 (Mutual Security Assistance) authorities to organize, train, and 
equip this new force for the AFP that would be called the LRC.130 
1st SFG initially deployed to the Philippines in March 2001 to train the Philippine Light 
Reaction Company (LRC) into a counter terrorism capability.131 Although actions by the 
ASG prompted U.S. intervention, what USSOF found after arrival in country was a diverse 
group of threats, each posing differing and complex challenges to the overall security 
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situation in the Philippines. Other threat groups included the communist insurgency New 
People’s Army (NPA) which was active throughout the country, an Islamic separatist group 
known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Over time, U.S. advisors saw threats 
change with the MILF splinter group known as Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters 
(BIFF). Moreover, after the emergence of ISIL in 2014, groups such as ASG and BIFF 
both pledged fealty to Islamic State of Levant (ISIL), although no direct connections 
between the groups have been established.132 Despite proposals to increase troop presence 
in the Philippines and take a more direct approach to solving the terrorism problem in the 
Philippines, SOF again proposed taking a long-term investment strategy towards the 
Philippines so as not to enlarge pre-existing anti-American predispositions in the 
Philippines. Due to Philippines’ sensitivities from the U.S.’s long history of involvement 
in the Philippines to include long standing support of the Marcos dictatorship, U.S. forces 
to include USSOF were given very strict rules of engagement (ROE) and forced to conduct 
all operations with a Philippine partner.133 While it is unclear if the long-term investment 
strategy will pay off, the Philippines seems to have increased their security capabilities 
post-U.S. intervention, which will be highlighted in this case study evaluation. 
C. CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
U.S. military operations in the Philippines from 2001–2020 is a classic case of FID 
and serves as a benchmark for engagement with countries dealing with transnational 
security threats. It is important to identify a distinction in this case between FID and 
security cooperation. FID is the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 
terrorism, and other threats to their security.”134 FID can include indirect support such as 
military exchange programs, military exercises, and building infrastructure to support 
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defense goals. 135  FID can also include direct support which includes, “civil-military 
operations (CMO) (primarily the provision of services to the local populace), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), communications and intelligence cooperation, mobility, and logistic 
support.”136 Security cooperation on the other hand focuses on DOD interactions with 
foreign defense institutions to promote U.S. interests, while building partner capabilities 
and developing relationships for contingency operations. 137  U.S. assistance in the 
Philippines focused on FID, by providing direct support to Philippine forces via operational 
assistance to forces engaged in combat, and CMO and Information Operations (IO) 
support. 138  U.S. forces in the Philippines truly worked by, with, and through their 
Philippine counterparts to defeat insurgent forces and create a safer Philippines nation, 
while maintaining a relatively low force number. Due to a low force number, USSOF in 
the Philippines were forced to rely on other entities to leverage other instruments of 
DIMEFIL outside of security and focus military engagements on building the capability of 
their Philippine counterparts. Such operations would not have been as effective if not for 
careful coordination with other agencies across the USG, and the use of creative solutions 
that engaged multiple arms of DIMEFIL in a concerted manner to defeat complex problem 
sets such as ASG. This case is evaluated using the DIMEFIL model, looking at how SOF 
integrated into each element of national power, while leveraging the civil domain during 
operations.  
1. Diplomatic 
Integration with the State department was critical to Joint Special Operations Task 
Force-Philippines’s (JSOTF-P) success in the Philippines. On top of using the Interagency 
Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), USSOF helped develop the Mindanao working 
group which brought together all elements of the U.S. country team in the Philippines.139 
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This working group created the Mindanao Engagement Strategy which detailed JSOTF-
P’s support of State department initiatives.140 This coordination enabled the eventual 
removal of Abu Solaiman, an ASG leader, in a subsequent operation that will be discussed 
further in later sections.141 
2. Information 
Upon reviewing the information instrument for the case of the Philippines, not a lot 
of detail was found as to actual operations and their effects. Generalizations of operations 
were available, and IO was often discussed as being fully integrated into military 
operations; with little distinction between SOF IO operations and other actors including 
other elements of USG. SOF’s principal information action arms operating in the 
Philippines during this time were PSYOPs teams. PSYOPs are a tactical level unit that 
focuses on direct messaging the population via a variety of media and mediums. PSYOPs 
teams (formerly known as MIST or military information support teams), worked in a 
variety of manners to compliment interagency efforts, as well as support Philippine 
government governance: “Military information support teams (MISTs) provided a range 
of services aimed at improving the target population’s perceptions of the GRP’s legitimacy 
and building support for the rule of law.”142 
PSYOPs teams handed out leaflets that supported the mission to identify and 
eventually kill ASG leader Abu Solaiman in 2007.143 Presumedly, each of these efforts 
were coordinated through the State Department through the Mindanao working group 
mentioned earlier, as no evidence was found to state otherwise. 
3. Military 
U.S. military investments in the Philippines 2001–2014 were limited to a small 
command and control structure, Joint Task Force 510, which controlled all U.S. military 
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operations in the Philippines. Of the 1,300 forces initially allowed to enter the Philippines, 
only 600 personnel were allowed to deploy to the southern regions where insurgent activity 
was most prevalent due to a force cap imposed by the Philippine government.144 Between 
2009 and 2015, the USG spent between $11 million dollars and $27 million dollars in 
foreign military financing.145 Joint Special Operations Task Force, referred to as JSOTF-
P, commanded and controlled all USSOF in the Philippines. JSOTF-P support to the 
Philippines operated and advised at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in advising 
Philippine security forces. At the tactical level, USSOF has trained multiple elements up 
to a high degree of proficiency thanks to slow and steady gains by Philippine SOF.146 
Operational level advising focused on working with the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) to refine their planning procedures, command and control functions, and better 
integrate intelligence into their operations process.147 While these two levels worked 
together to increase capabilities of the AFP, USSOF also worked with AFP to develop 
institutional improvements to their force structures that included developing strategy and 
coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and created a Philippine SOF pipeline that 
became a “self-sustaining SOF enterprise.”148 These improvements over time enabled 
AFP to grow its ability to conduct effective military operations as they pursued the various 
insurgent groups operating throughout the southern areas of the Philippines. 
CMO provides a unique capability to the joint force commander during any 
operation;, that often combines military engagement and security with development and 
other programs across the DIMEFIL spectrum. Often, these operations include 
collaboration with outside entities such as the U.S. State Department and USAID, in 
addition to sometimes working with non-governmental organizations whose agendas align 
with CMO projects and U.S. interests. CMO made up a significant component of U.S. 
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engagement in the Philippines.149 According to JP 357, CMO can be defined as, “Civil-
Military Operations (CMO). CMO are the activities performed by military forces to 
establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and 
indigenous populations and institutions (IPI).”150 CMO enabled U.S. forces to identify 
population needs and problems and address them through appropriate programs, while at 
the same time improving receptiveness of the population to the Philippines government. 
U.S. CA forces came in to provide medical or veterinary support and infrastructure projects 
such as health facilities and schools to the population in contested areas. This effort helped 
Philippines forces begin to deny insurgents support from the population. These operations 
also fostered improved relationships between Philippine forces and the populace, making 
it easier for Philippine forces to pursue insurgent forces.151 CMO is not always applicable 
to an operation but provides a useful engagement strategy that is best leveraged when other 
elements of DIMEFIL are incorporated to achieve synergistic effects. 
4. Economic 
Since 2001, economic aid has played a significant part in the U.S.’s balanced 
approach to the Philippines. The economic challenges faced by the Philippines have been 
complex. While fighting an insurgency over the last two decades, the Philippines has 
contended with natural disasters such as typhoons, and in 2020, COVID-19. These 
additional challenges placed economic strain on the Philippines, that if not addressed, could 
have pushed more of the population towards the growing insurgency, even as they attempt 
to establish legitimacy through populace support. USAID has historically provided more 
than $100 million dollars in economic aid to the Philippines annually since 2010. Economic 
aid reached nearly $176 million dollars in 2020 alone, most likely due to the effects of 
COVID-19 and Typhoon Goni both of which had significant impacts on the country.152 
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Looking at the GCI, the Philippines hit a low in 2009 with an overall score of 3.90.153 
Since 2010, the Philippines GCI score rose incrementally every year, up to 4.36 in 2016, 
placing the Philippines in 67th place when compared competitively to other countries in 
the world according to World Bank and World Economic Forum.154 Despite early SOF 
operations not tapping fully into expertise held by U.S. Embassy personnel, eventually 
JSOTF-P CMO and IO supported the Philippines government in projecting legitimacy to 
affected populations, while decreasing popular support of the insurgency with State 
Department and USAID programs, USG: 
Nonetheless, CA activities did secure tactical access and population 
sentiment in both Basilan and Jolo, which can contribute to strategic 
objectives. For example, during Operation Ultimatum in 2006, despite AFP 
reluctance to enter the area between Jolo City and the MNLF camp, JSOTF-
P CA enlisted the support of the mayor to conduct MEDCAPs, VETCAPs, 
and dental civic action programs.155 
These programs were eventually emulated throughout other areas of operations in the 
country.156 These activities provided opportunities for access to the population, which in 
turn generated actionable information, and denied ASG access to the population over 
time.157 
5. Finance
Terrorism and insurgencies alike require funding to enable operations and to 
impose cost on the government which insurgents or terrorists seek to attack. Banaloi asserts 
that the ASG is a, “hybrid violent group that arguably falls under the complex nexus of 
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crime and terrorism.”158 Throughout the conflict in the Philippines, the U.S. Treasury has 
designated leadership from ASG as terrorists, which enables a freezing of any U.S. 
connected assets, such as Jainal Antel Sali Jr., Radulan Sahiron, and Isnilon Totoni Hapilon 
in a 2005 sanction.159 In addition to U.S. sanctions, often the Philippine government has 
supported financial targeting efforts by establishing rewards for information leading to the 
capture of individuals with established links to groups such as ASG. In the case of Sali, 
Sahiron, and Hapilon, the Philippine government announced a 5,000,000 reward for 
information leading to their capture. 160  The U.S. has also used rewards to generate 
incentives in the Philippines population to generate information leading to the capture of 
high-level terrorists. The USG offered rewards of $5,000,000 for information leading to 
the capture of Abu Sabaya and Abu Solaiman who were both high level ASG members.161 
Financial resources can support other elements of DIMEFIL by either constraining 
resources available to threat actors, or by offering incentives to the population to encourage 
conversations with host nation or coalition/U.S. forces. 
6. Intelligence 
Intelligence was identified as a significant weakness of the Philippine forces prior 
to U.S. involvement.162 AFP also lacked precision strike capabilities and effective air 
ground coordination, both necessary to use intelligence generated from the operational 
environment and impose cost on insurgent forces.163 U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to support Philippine 
forces as they developed each of these capabilities.164 To integrate intelligence activities 
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into operations more effectively, the U.S. advising team helped the AFP develop Philippine 
led operations and intelligence fusion teams at varying levels and echelons of command, 
which helped integrate intelligence in the AFP operation cycle. Additionally, $1.2 million 
dollars of military assistance were spent funding a 60-person intelligence fusion center for 
the Philippines Southern Command Headquarters (SOUTHCOMHQ) which had control of 
five operational brigades (BDE) in the southern parts of the country, where most of the 
insurgent activity was concentrated. 165  Over time, intelligence capabilities of AFP 
improved, and the AFP began capitalizing on opportunities while synchronizing their own 
elements of DIMEFIL. In the case of Abu Solaiman, after the $5,000,000 reward was put 
out to the media, a low-level insurgent’s wife convinced her husband to turn on the ASG, 
thanks in part to their recent atrocities against Muslims that IO units were able to publicize. 
Philippine intelligence turned the informant and were able to develop the current 
whereabouts of Abu Solaiman. After receiving the tip on his whereabouts, AFP mounted 
an assault resulting in the eventual death of Abu Solaiman and two other ASG members.166 
The operation highlighted the effectiveness of coordination across agencies both from the 
U.S. and Philippines thanks to, “effective fusion of intelligence and operations and efforts 
by law enforcement and the U.S. State Department that yielded the critical intelligence on 
Abu Solaiman’s location.”167 Operations like these show that when certain elements of 
national power are brought together in an optimal way, success is achievable. 
7. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement represents one the greatest risks posed to security in the 
Philippines. The Philippine National Police (PNP) is the main policing force in the 
Philippines and is made up of twelve operational components that each deal with a different 
aspect of securing the Philippines.168 Despite these capabilities, the PNP unsuccessfully 
dealt with the budding insurgency problem in the late 1990s, which paved the way for AFP 
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and U.S. intervention, due to a lack of training and competency. Even as late as 2016, the 
capability of the PNP to secure the interior of the Philippines has been called into 
question.169 Rivalries also challenged interoperability and positive relationships between 
police and military forces.170 USSOF advised mostly the PNP component SAF which is 
responsible for, “civil disturbance control, internal security operations, hostage-taking 
rescue operations, search and rescue in times of natural calamities, disasters and national 
emergencies, and other special police operations such as anti-hijacking, anti-terrorism, 
explosives and ordnance disposal.”171 Despite extensive training, 44 PNP SAF members 
were killed after being ambushed by MILF forces, an Islamic separatist group, in January 
2015. While SOF trained with some elements of Philippine law enforcement at times, the 
most value came from working with the legal attaché (LEGAT) at the embassy who is a 
U.S. Department of Justice representative.172 David Kris, a Legal Attaché who served in 
the Philippines, summarizes how law enforcement was used effectively in supporting 
whole-of-government operations to defeat ASG and other groups in, “Law Enforcement as 
a Counter-Terrorism Tool”.173 Kris acknowledges the challenges of working with Law 
Enforcement, and also recognizes the value of using the right tool for the right job: “We 
should continue to use all of the military, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and 
economic tools at our disposal, selecting in each case the particular tool that is most 
effective under the circumstances, consistent with our laws and values.”.174 This approach 
and the others used in this case are discussed in the case study analysis. 
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D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Overall, the Philippines has turned into a FID success story and may serve as a 
model for effective U.S. intervention through careful advisement of indigenous forces to 
help them solve their own internal security issues. Repeatedly, in each instance where 
operations significantly improved the situation in the Philippines, a multi-element use of  
the DIMEFIL approach was found to be evident. USSOF essentially built an operating 
concept that enabled access to insurgent support areas through effective CMO activities 
such as humanitarian assistance projects. Once access was built, PSYOPs and other 
elements of SOF were able to deliver pro-government and ani-insurgent messaging while  
alerting Philippine citizens of programs which could help lead to the capture of insurgent 
leaders through monetary rewards. These programs enabled Philippine forces to impose 
cost on insurgent groups as insurgent leadership targeted degraded insurgent operations. 
As AFP slowly entered insurgent areas and their military operations became more effective 
over time, insurgents lost popular support and slowly became more fractionalized. 
No approach to any security problem will ever be perfect. In light of these 
successes, there were a few failures. The PNP lacked the capacity and training to secure 
their own country effectively, which forced the AFP to deal with security issues. Often, 
threat groups had ties that created endemic security challenges, and some elements of 
USSOF believe that the security situation as a whole could have been dealt with more 
systematically.175 Despite many instances of effective U.S. interagency collaboration cited 
in this case, some elements of the USG described challenges which arose at times, such as 
failures by JSOTF-P personnel to routinely lean on U.S. embassy expertise.176 One way 
these shortcomings were mitigated was through the placement of a USAID liaison officer 
at JSOTF-P that, “increased collaboration in later years to reduce redundancy, increase 
effectiveness, and provide USAID a secure location in Mindanao.”177  
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The U.S. made smart investments over the course of its engagement in the 
Philippines. Economic assistance enabled the Philippine economy to improve, offering 
alternatives to insurgent recruitment. USSOF helped improve the capacity of AFP and 
other entities such as PNP to develop their own institutional capacity to train and develop 
their own forces. When compared to other cases, the Philippines offers a model that slow 
and steady investment with a balanced approach to DIMEFIL, over a long-term time 
horizon can generate results. 
Overall, the case of  U.S. intervention in the Philippines provides useful insights 
into how USSOF can integrate all elements of the DIMEFIL model into its operations, 
while leveraging elements of the civil domain to achieve overarching U.S. strategic 
objectives. Every USG agency operating in the Philippines during this time contributed to 
the mission of supporting the Philippine government to defeat each of the security threats 
posed to it by insurgent groups. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, U.S. forces were set to be 
removed from the Philippines due to changes in the political situation of the Philippines. 
The country’s current president, Rodrigo Duterte, froze the agreement that would have seen 
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines in 2020.178 The changing political 
leanings undoubtedly can affect the trajectory of a security situation for a country, and only 
time will tell what U.S.-Philippine cooperation will look like in the future. For the next 
case, “Russian Annexation of Crimea in 2014,” research will look at how one of the U.S. 
competitors, Russia, balanced its use of SOF across instruments of national power while 
operating significantly in the civil domain to achieve a political agenda. 
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VII. CASE STUDY #4: RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF 
CRIMEA IN 2014 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Crimean separatists began demonstrations in 2014, they shifted the trajectory 
of Crimea and Ukraine towards a war that few saw coming. After losing control of their 
proxies in the separatist state and realizing that Ukraine was unwilling to make political 
concessions despite the growing challenges to its sovereignty in the Crimean Peninsula, 
Russian oligarchs recognized that direct action was necessary to achieve their political 
goals.179 The Crimean issue continues to be a part of the conversation on the international 
stage. This case study will be slightly different than other cases in this thesis, as it evaluates 
the use of DIMEFIL and engagement within the civil domain from the perspective of the 
Russian Federation. This unique approach may offer insights from another perspective and 
identify which investments have and have not paid off in accomplishing its strategic goals. 
This also presents an opportunity to refrain from mirror imaging, by identifying what 
methods the Russians implemented to achieve its political agenda.  
By studying cases from a competitor’s perspective, USSOCOM has an opportunity 
to learn relevant insights into not only how to compete with that state in a future contested 
environment by learning from their past actions, but can also identify new ways and 
methods to engage in the civil domain. Ukraine represents not only a case that showed 
Russia’s true colors and its commitment to achieving political goals up to and beyond the 
use of force, but it also highlights the friction created when two great powers rub against 
each other in their periphery. Ukraine represents an economic, political, and geographic 
buffer that Russia wishes to maintain influence over as the strength and reach of NATO 
continues to expand in the west. In this case, not only will the Russian perspective be 
evaluated, but insights can also be gained from the limited involvement the U.S. has 
invested in the space. This case brings into question many themes brought up from previous 
cases: appropriate levels of troops, to include SOF; merging of civil and military 
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capabilities; and creating leverage through other elements of the DIMEFIL model. All of 
these themes will be explored to assess what proved to be effective in the contested space 
of Crimea. 
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
The case of Crimea presents opportunities to evaluate many manners of military 
action on part of both the Russians and the Ukrainians. However, discussion in this thesis 
is limited to Russian SOF’s roles and actions that occurred in the civil domain that directly 
affected military operations and objectives. The 2017 RAND study, Lessons from Russian 
Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine was primarily used to gain an understanding 
of what actually happened and identify relevant observations.180 At the outset, it appeared 
that Russian forces were not numerically superior to the Ukrainian forces stationed in the 
Crimean Peninsula at the time, which best estimates put at 15–18k.181 The first event in a 
series of developments occurred on February 24th when “the city council in Sevastopol 
installed a Russian citizen as mayor, and several units from the 810th Naval Infantry 
arrived in the city square in armored personnel carriers (APCs).”182 Russia knew there was 
a threshold of armed conflict it wanted to stay under and played a different game; using its 
Komandovanie sil spetsial’nalnykh operatsii (KSO) unit which is Russia’s equivalent of 
SOF, it posed as a “local ‘self-defense militia’ [that] seized the Crimean Parliament and 
raised a Russian flag over the building.”183 While it is not likely the leadership of Crimea 
coordinated with Russian leadership, the political upheaval in Crimea certainly gave Russia 
time to begin maneuvering its forces throughout the peninsula and gain strategic 
advantages.184 This is a clear case of how events in the civil domain can have a significant 
impact on the outcomes of other domains, in this case, the employment of Russian forces. 
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Leveraging the diplomatic element of national power to use deception, again, allowed the 
Russians to establish local militia, organized by Russian intelligence operatives, while 
Russian Airborne troops donned Crimean police uniforms to further add to the fog of 
conflict.185 By March 26th, 2014, a referendum was passed, and Russia effectively seized 
control of Crimea with little to no resistance from Ukraine and no direct casualties.186 
What happened in Ukraine provides a playbook for how Russia alternated between direct 
and indirect means to achieve its political agenda. Russia used its SOF and intelligence 
operatives to set conditions for its conventional forces by engaging in the civil domain and 
taking advantage of the weak Ukrainian government presence by influencing Crimea to 
push for annexation. 
C. CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
The case of Russia’s operations surrounding its annexation of Crimea can provide 
useful insights into how a state can leverage multiple elements of DIMEFIL in only a 
matter of months. Russia’s use of elements of DIMEFIL had its fair share of risks and 
opportunities of which some paid off and some did not. Overall, from the Russian 
perspective, the case was a success as it supported its political goals of splintering Ukraine 
and created favorable conditions in Ukraine for follow on operations such as in Donbas 
and Donetesk. Russia gained a new port to expand its Anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) 
bubble and project combat power in the Black Sea region.187 Analysis presented in this 
particular case is scoped to operations specifically in Crimea conducted by Russia between 
February and April of 2014. Russia’s use of its SOF, intelligence apparatus, and its 
conventional forces to engage elements of the civil domain across DIMEFIL show 
successes and failures derived from the campaign. 
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For Russia, popular support back home appeared to be important when deciding 
how and when to employ forces, and the eventual annexation of Crimea: 
The annexation of Crimea, which sent Putin’s approval ratings into the 80 
percent range for a remarkable four years, may be why people say there is 
public approval for aggressive Russian foreign policy. The annexation 
created a “collective euphoria” that “led to an emotional outpouring of 
pride, hope and trust in Russia’s leaders.”188 
It is unclear if annexation was the end goal for Russia or if it was to simply create political 
discord for Ukraine by supporting Crimean separatists in breaking away from Ukraine.189 
Diplomatically, it is unclear what if any diplomatic assets or resources were leveraged by 
Russia to annex Crimea specifically in the Crimean Peninsula, as most of its operations 
that were assessed for this thesis fell into the Information, Military, and other categorical 
elements of DIMEFIL.  
2. Information 
Russia began its information campaign a day prior to Russian takeover of 
government buildings in Crimea.190 This shows the potential of timing an information 
campaign with military activities aimed at focusing effects in support of one clear 
objective, the annexation of Crimea. While Russia’s agenda was clear, the effects of its 
information warfare campaign and psychological operations were not. Russia assumed that 
a critical vulnerability of the Ukrainian forces in Crimea was their corruptibility and low 
morale. Despite this, most Ukrainian forces did not surrender, and some units were even 
able to escape with equipment such as aircraft back into Ukraine proper.191 
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Military action is often the easiest to characterize, with large troop deployments, 
observable naval fleet maneuvers, and even aircraft sorties. While Russia certainly 
employed conventional forces in a military action as a part of its campaign to annex 
Crimea, Russia also subtly employed and counted on its SOF to carry out some of its more 
brutal actions. A well-orchestrated Russian deception campaign, or Maskirovka, meaning 
mask or concealment, was key to all of Russian attempts in the seizing of Crimea which 
enabled Russia to confuse Ukrainian decision makers and delay the Ukrainian response.192 
This deception was pulled off by executing a series of snap exercises across Russia, ordered 
by Putin, which drew attention away from Crimea and enabled Russian SOF and other 
similar capabilities to begin setting conditions to control the populace and enable a swift 
occupation through its SOF and Airborne forces in Crimea to favor succession and 
annexation.193 
4. Economic 
The economic approach Russia took towards Crimea is not apparent. No clear 
approaches were identified in research for how Russia used economic power to affect the 
outcome in Crimea. What has been evident in years past though, is how Russia continues 
to invest in Crimea to bolster its economy, with annual investments fluctuating between $1 
and $2.7 billion. 194  Russia’s annexation of Crimea negatively affected the Crimea 
economy, forcing most goods to be imported from Russia at a high price.195 
5. Financial 
From the lens of finance, no clear actions were evident that occurred which gave 
Russia a more advantageous position as its forces infiltrated Crimea in the spring of 2014. 
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Since 2014 a variety of sanctions have been imposed on Russia, and Crimea since its 
annexation, that probably have affected the financial situation in Crimea, and impacting 
the people of Crimea.196 
6. Intelligence 
Russia used the significant advantages it had as it enabled the annexation of Crimea. 
As Russian intelligence operatives worked in Crimea, by sharing language and having 
similar cultures, this potentially enabled Russia to gain intelligence advantages and make 
incentivizing local citizens of Crimea to work for Russian intelligence more likely.197 
Often, it can be hard to differentiate between simply Russian military intelligence service, 
or Glavnoje Razvedyvatel’noje Upravlenije (GRU), operations and Russian intelligence 
operations, given the diverse intelligence capabilities Russia possesses. It has been 
established, however, that elements of the GRU were directly involved in the conflict in 
Crimea. Several senior GRU officers, led by Igor Girkin, commanded the rebel forces and 
served as political advisers to the Russian leaders of the “people’s republic.” As in Crimea, 
the GRU seems to be President Vladimir Putin‘s weapon of choice in expanding Russian 
power outside of Russia and into the territories of the successor states of the Soviet 
Union.198 
Specifics of Russian intelligence operations in Crimea were largely unavailable in 
open sources; therefore, it is hard to gauge the extent and impact of intelligence activities 
on Russian operations in the peninsula. Russia undoubtedly planned intelligence activities 
throughout the civil domain in Crimea, which to some extent supported its overarching 
political agenda of the ultimate annexation of Crimea. Perhaps, the success of Russian 
intelligence operations can be measured by the extent to which all of their activities in the 
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peninsula were not uncovered by the West. Conceptualized this way, Russian intelligence 
operations were well synchronized and supported overarching Russian political agendas. 
7. Law Enforcement 
Russia potentially recognized the importance of law enforcement activities and 
their ability to control the populace and took action to control policing activity throughout 
the annexation of Crimea. Russia developed local militias as previously mentioned, and 
had some troops wear local police uniforms to give the appearance Crimea was still under 
control by the local government.199 This probably was more feasible for Russian forces 
instead of another country due to the shared common language and culture of Russians 
with Crimeans, as previously established. Ukraine also created several opportunities for 
Russia to take advantage of leading up to Russia’s infiltration and annexation. 
The second error occurred on February 24, when Igor Mosiichuk, a leader 
of Right Sector, a far-right political party and paramilitary group in Ukraine, 
publicly threatened to bring paramilitary fighters to Crimea. Russian-
language media used Mosiichuk’s statements to convey a sense of imminent 
danger for those living in Crimea. Crimean Berkut riot-police officers, 
reinforced with Kuban Cossacks, who reside in parts of Russia near the 
Black Sea, set up checkpoints under the guise of responding to a potential 
right-wing threat. Clashes between Crimean Tatars and Russian 
nationalists, protests for secession from Ukraine, and counter-protests for 
unity ensued, leading to a general state of chaos and disorganization, which 
facilitated Russia’s take over.200 
Ukraine made further mistakes by failing to grasp the strategic atmosphere around 
its law enforcement entities in the Crimean Peninsula: 
The third error occurred on February 25, when Ukraine’s minister of interior 
disbanded the Crimean Berkut riot-police returning to Sevastopol after 
suppressing protests in Kyiv. Specifically, the central government first sent 
the unit back to Crimea and then disbanded it. This was a humiliation for 
the security forces, which believed they were carrying out their duties as 
ordered and forced them to search for new employment. Upon their return 
to Sevastopol, these units were greeted as heroes by the people and issued 
Russian passports by Moscow. They defected to the Russian side and 
 
199 Michael Kofman et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 10. 
200 Michael Kofman et al., 21. 
 
70 
provided auxiliary units in early operations, when Russia was short on 
manpower.201  
Russia’s recognition of the importance of law enforcement and its ability to 
contribute to its ability to project force and control the population gave it a strategic 
advantage that only complemented other operations that were occurring simultaneously 
across the spectrum of DIMEFIL in Crimea. 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Russia’s successes in Crimea give insights into how USG and USSOCOM could 
potentially leverage civil and military capabilities in a combined manner to achieve 
political ends. Russia utilized its SOF to focus on setting conditions within the population 
and creating the ability to affect political change by taking charge of the police. Russia 
used its SOF to make it seem as if the Crimean people were asking for Russia to come in 
and restore order after Ukraine disbanded its police force and changed political regimes. 
Russia focused on taking advantage of its shared culture and language with Crimeans to 
enable intelligence and military backed policing operations. Once conditions were set in 
Crimea, Russia entered with a sizeable force to gain control and deter further aggression 
from Ukraine to retake the peninsula. Overall, Russia executed the operation by taking 
advantage of opportunities it was poised to seize once Ukraine began military and political 
missteps, showing the detail of Russian contingency operation planning and 
synchronization of DIMEFIL efforts. 
Russia made its fair share of mistakes in infiltrating Crimea. It remains unclear if 
Russia ultimately planned to annex Crimea, or if they simply wanted to create political 
havoc for Ukraine due to its growing connection with the West. Pushing for annexation 
certainly came at a higher cost for Russia, forcing them to deploy troops and actively take 
control of the peninsula. The extent to which most Crimeans wanted Russia to reclaim 
Crimea is uncertain, but there were certainly documented sentiments among the population 
who aligned with a pro-Russia agenda. If pushed to occupy a region where they did not 
share language and cultural similarities with a pre-existing support base as the case here, it 
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is uncertain if the same strategies and tactics Russia used would have been successful. 
Russia assumed a significant operational vulnerability in the Ukrainian forces stationed in 
Ukraine and may have expected more defections from Ukrainian forces than how many 
occurred.202 Russia did seem to care more about the popularity of its Crimean campaign 
at home than whether the local political leaders were cooperative with the new pro-Russia 
agenda.203  
E. FINDINGS 
Perhaps Russia’s greatest investment in Crimea is its continued financial and 
economic support it provides yearly to Crimea; as it took control of the peninsula, it took 
responsibility for the economic conditions in the country. Central to the success of this 
campaign Russia orchestrated was its low cost in terms of violence and military assets. 
Russia used a blend of intelligence, SOF, and conventional forces with support of a robust 
information warfare campaign to achieve its political agenda. Russia limited the number 
of troops it used to affect the annexation and instead focused on strategic positioning of its 
forces, the use of deception, and the blending of military and civilian operations into a 
cohesive campaign that resulted in no direct casualties and was accomplished in two 
months. 
Russia’s campaign to create political havoc for Ukraine and the ultimate annexation 
of Crimea provides lessons in combining elements of DIMEFIL to achieve a political end. 
Russia maintains certain advantages over other more democratic states such as the U.S. 
Russia possesses the ability to create a singular narrative that is propagated by the state and 
the oligarchy. It can simultaneously leverage its military and intelligence assets in a manner 
it sees fit with little oversight from concerned parties. Russia’s use of deception was an 
integral part of this operation and most likely will continue to be a trend. This case brings 
up the question of how much deception is ideal and necessary when executing military 
operations within the civil domain. The use of deception in Crimea overall proved effective 
as Russia strategically positioned its forces in preparation for action in the peninsula. 
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However, deception use long term can have unintended consequences and can sow distrust 
with civil partners in an operating environment. Russia assumed that risk and mitigated it 
by employing forces that shared cultural and language similarities as the region it was 
occupying. The U.S. will most likely not find itself in a similar position in the future. It 
may be useful to consider how deception can be used in limited instances to confuse and 
delay adversarial decision making, especially if that deception occurs in the civil domain 
where the U.S. has historically engaged on a limited basis in past operations as this thesis 
has attempted to establish. Looking back at the American experience, the next case, 
American intervention in “Afghanistan,” will highlight how an over dependence on 




VIII. CASE STUDY #5: AFGHANISTAN, 2001–2020 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this final case study, I argue that an over reliance on the military instrument of 
national power in Afghanistan resulted in the U.S. failing to achieve victory. Whether it be 
the plethora of precision drone strikes, repeated SOF direct action raids, or simply the 
oversaturation of counter insurgent forces in the form of troops from NATO nations that 
make up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), all of it was too much. The 
SOCOM’s strategy in Afghanistan over relies on precision lethal targeting. The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism found that the U.S. DOD conducted an estimated 1071 aircraft or 
drone strikes in 2016, and an estimated 2607–2609 strikes in 2017.204 These high volumes 
of strikes represent only one way the USSOCOM, and the U.S. military at large over relied 
on lethality to achieve victory in Afghanistan. 
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan also represents an opportunity to examine a 
country that has historically been caught in the middle of great power competition, as it sits 
in the periphery of the Russian Federation. Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979, which 
provided an opportunity for the U.S. to chip away at Soviet influence as it fought its way 
through the Hindu Kush, only to foreshadow America’s similar experience in Afghanistan 
a mere 20 years later. Additionally, the U.S. has conducted every phase of an operation 
based on the model found in Joint Publication 30 “Phasing an Operation Based on 
Predominant Military Activities,” being involved from Russian intervention during the 
1980s through its current limited involvement at the time of this writing.205 This range of 
activities provides much to examine with regard to the civil domain, military action, and 
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how the U.S. has and has not leveraged other elements of DIMEFIL to achieve its 
objectives. 
One of the more challenging aspects of Afghanistan for the U.S. is the difference 
in culture and structures throughout the operational environment. This makes both working 
with Afghans to help them secure their own country and achieving U.S. objectives a 
pressing challenge.206 The Pashtuns ethnic group, which almost exclusively makes up the 
Taliban, represents 42% of Afghanistan’s total population, with the remainder being made 
up of ethnicities of Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baloch, Turkmen, and Tajiks.207 Each of these tribes 
changes the dynamics of an effective engagement strategy across the DIMEFIL spectrum. 
When dealing with Pashtun tribes, American forces have had to grapple with the simple 
yet complex nature of their tribal law, known as Pashtunwali. 208 The tribal code of 
Pashtunwali, that could be coined, “law for the lawless,” creates customary law that rejects 
the notion of the state.209 These varying cultural dynamics create challenges for the USG 
in the application of force, and other elements of DIMEFIL, such as the development of a 
national government aimed at providing security for the entire nation. 
Afghanistan also provides a comparison for other conflicts due to the high troop 
presence, surging to over 110,000 troops in 2011 before a tapering down to 8,600 troops 
in 2020.210 It is unclear SOF deployed over the course of the war. Most likely, the amount 
of SOF deployed to Afghanistan throughout the war varied and remained relatively low in 
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contrast to all of the U.S. military’s presence.211 When compared to other case studies 
presented in this thesis, a stark contrast in numbers of troops is evident. Afghanistan has 
also had considerable involvement from USSOCOM and other NATO SOF partners who 
have invested heavily to change systemic problems in the country related to Afghan SOF 
capabilities and capacity. As effective as SOF may have been up to this point in improving 
the capacity of Afghan SOF as well as other initiatives such as the Village Stability 
Operations model, no strategic end-state in Afghanistan currently exists.212 
B. SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
The U.S. has been involved in Afghanistan since the 1980s, when Russia moved 
into Afghanistan to support the installment of a pro-communist regime.213 During the 
1990s, the U.S. had limited involvement until September 11th, 2001 when the Al-Qaida 
leader Osama Bin Laden planned a terrorist attack on the United States from the mountains 
of Afghanistan. This attack on the United States hurled the U.S. into Afghanistan to remove 
the ruling political party, the Taliban, and hunt down the man responsible for the 9/11 
attacks. While the Taliban was no match for the combined military might of the U.S. and 
its allies that support the war effort, the situation in Afghanistan quickly changed from a 
limited duration high intensity conflict to an unlimited duration low intensity 
counterinsurgency that would continue for the next 20 years. The U.S. achieved its initial 
goal of hunting down Osama Bin Laden in 2011 when he was killed during an operation 
to find him after a series of intelligence breakthroughs. It was revealed he had been hiding 
for several years in a discrete compound near Abottabad, Pakistan. With each new U.S. 
presidential administration, objectives, end states, and strategy has changed significantly, 
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which is often the challenge with democratic nations that elect new political leaders every 
term. 
C. CASE STUDY EVALUATION 
There is no shortage in literature available about the American approach to “win 
the war” in Afghanistan and successfully transition responsibility for the country over to a 
national government that was backed by the people of Afghanistan. Given the robust 
scholarship in this area, the scope of this analysis follows the format presented early on in 
this research. Specifically, this analysis focuses on identifying how SOF has engaged in 
the civil domain of Afghanistan while attempting to combine elements of DIMEFIL, and 
the degree to which this engagement did or did not contribute to U.S. progress in 
Afghanistan and its status today. 
1. Diplomatic 
Diplomacy in a highly fractionalized and tribal country like Afghanistan with a 
weak central government is a tricky thing. It is not as simple as in other countries where 
the U.S. engages at the diplomatic level where discussing policy and partnerships creates 
meaningful progress, especially as history has shown “Strong centralization of power in 
Kabul creates a backlash against any government there, as it ignores the historic ability of 
the people to govern themselves.”214 Despite the challenges of using diplomacy in a place 
like Afghanistan, the State department has invested heavily there, and often SOF has been 
the tip of the spear to facilitate interagency coordination and collaboration to achieve multi-
polar objectives. This coordination and investment from the State department often 
occurred at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), which was a whole-of-government 
concept and approach to solving problems in Afghanistan. 215 U.S. State Department 
personnel surged to 600 personnel supporting PRTs across Afghanistan in 2007, on top of 
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nearly $5 billion in foreign aid provided in that year alone. Those 600 personnel supported 
25 PRTs across Afghanistan, which was the State Department’s leading effort in its 
investment of resources and personnel in Afghanistan.216 Most diplomatic efforts focused 
on improving the provincial level of governance through the action arm of these PRTs; 
however it is unclear from research to what extent SOF supported these PRTs, as from a 
command and control perspective most PRTs were supported and responsible to each of 
the regional commands, of which there were a total of four according to a NATO report 
from 2007.217 Most likely, due to the command and control of SOF units falling under 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) control, 
interaction and coordination between SOF and PRTs may have varied widely. As most 
SOF were focused on the tribal level, with State Department focused on the provincial 
level, a disparity emerged in diplomatic efforts. A provincial governor in Afghanistan may 
be fully supported by the government of Afghanistan; but this did not necessarily mean 
that the people or tribes of an area submitted to such authority. Often, local tribal leaders, 
commonly referred to as warlords due to their adherence to the code of Pashtunwali, were 
the leaders engaged with by SOF. This created a complex dichotomy in differing 
engagement strategies between SOF engagement and other stakeholder engagements, such 
as State Department, and other non-SOF elements of ISAF. SOF continually identified 
tribal leaders throughout Afghanistan because they were often in more austere locations 
away from the PRT locations. While sometimes efforts at the provincial level 
complemented engagements at the tribal level by other Unified Action Partners (UAP), 
both efforts were holistically disparate with sometimes competing agendas, as SOF sought 
out partners who could act immediately because they wielded real power, while PRTs 
worked the long game, helping provincial Afghan leaders build legitimacy over time. 
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Information operations in Afghanistan presented quite the challenge for American 
policy makers; as the old saying goes “Any press is good press.” Prior to the arrival of 
General Petraeus as head U.S. Commander of all forces in Afghanistan in 2010, when the 
U.S. would counter Taliban propaganda and condemn any sort of Taliban attack against 
Afghanistan civilians, the result would unintentionally perpetuate the Taliban story of the 
Afghanistan government’s and International Security Assistance Force’s inability to secure 
the population.218 This is a self-defeating cycle that the U.S. cannot win. After taking 
command, Petraeus shifted information operations policy to focus on dramatizing victims 
of Taliban attacks, showing the effects of Talibanization on Afghan and Pashtun culture, 
and bringing to light Taliban genocides of Shi’a Hizara, a smaller ethnic group in 
Afghanistan. 219  In a 2010 RAND study, Arturo Munoz discusses the challenges of 
PSYOPs effectiveness in Afghanistan, citing a variety of media and products disseminated 
throughout the first ten years of the Afghanistan War.220 In his closing thoughts, Munoz 
brings up valid points that show a lack of coordination between IO, PSYOPs, Public Affairs 
(PA) and other elements of USSOF operating in Afghanistan. Munoz concludes that up to 
2010, U.S. IO in Afghanistan had poor delivery, was clumsy, failed to seek local opinions, 
and was often unsophisticated in assuming the people of Afghanistan are simple.221 These 
challenges do not make crafting an effective IO campaign any easier, as recurring themes 
that air strikes, civilian casualties and night raids created antipathy among the Pashtun 
populace were continually perpetuated.222 
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Another key challenge to information dominance in Afghanistan is the competing 
agendas of information functions across SOF, conventional forces, and each of the different 
government agencies operating in the country. In previous cases, information operations 
across U.S. agencies were often synchronized and supported one another. However, in 
Afghanistan, due to either the increased troop presence, or complex nature of the country, 
information operations were often disparate. Once again, this is a significant drawback of 
a large presence and high troop numbers. Due to the scale of the operation and commitment 
of resources from both SOF, conventional forces and the State department each stakeholder 
is presenting their narrative that their information officer or psychological operations 
operator is recommending to that commander or director. In the information environment, 
there are numerous specialties and capabilities that form the information arm of any unit: 
Information Operations, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and Public Affairs, not to 
mention every soldier from every other military occupational specialty that may be 
operating in a given area and engaging with someone from the operational environment on 
any given day. 
What potentially exacerbates this problem of multiple sources of information with 
an unclear overall information strategy is the tribal nature of Afghanistan. In his report, 
Munoz also found that IO officers working in Afghanistan repeatedly commented on the 
necessity to ensure IO messaging reflected the target audience, and was not simply a mirror 
image of U.S. perceptions of the Afghan people. 223  Munoz also emphasized the 
importance of finding local voices and key communicators that could communicate the 
message to the relevant population. 224  Perhaps if more resources were devoted to 
identifying key communicators and understanding the audience, IO could have been more 
effective in Afghanistan. 
3. Military 
Numbers for SOF deployed to Afghanistan were not available for this research, but 
assumptions can be made that SOF presence in Afghanistan was significantly less than the 
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rest of U.S. forces. With nearly 110,000 troops including SOF at the height of the 
Afghanistan war in 2011, the military component made up the largest contribution to the 
effort, but this does not answer the question of how much return on investment the USG 
received after investing so heavily for many years. In FY 2016, Afghanistan received $751 
million dollars in DOS/DOD security assistance funding.225 That is just one year of 
support.  
The cultural complexities of Afghanistan once again pose challenges to American 
efforts. In their chapter “Security and Peacebuilding” found in Integrated Peacebuilding: 
Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict, Feigenbaum, Goldberg, and Vence-
Cheng describe the challenge to security enhancing operations holistically: 
For one, various armed groups including Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and the 
Hizb-i-Islami destabilize the Afghani government and undermine the SSR 
(Security Sector Reform) process. Similarly, the culture of warlordism 
resists regional government rule, and the pervasive narcotics trade 
exacerbates insecurity and instability (Sedra, 2004). Furthermore, the 
coalition’s lack of cultural understanding cripples essential elements of 
SSR, including the creation of a strong and functioning national army and 
police force, and of accountable and transparent defense and judicial 
ministries. A cultural specificity the coalition ignored in the initial SSR 
strategy in Afghanistan was the attention to ethnic demographics within the 
army, police, and defense ministry.226 
While it certainly is difficult for conventional forces to effectively train all of its 
members on language and cultural dynamics that may arise when executing a broad 
mission such as Afghanistan, one would hope that SOF would be up for the challenge. 
Operating in the civil domain inherently requires cultural intelligence and acuity, yet even 
members of SF have argued that the existing amount of cultural training SF receives is not 
enough.227 This begs the question: how do you create security in a place like Afghanistan 
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where each tribe controls small chunks of the countryside, there is no national allegiance, 
and ethnic differences create competing agendas? 
4. Economic
Assessing the economic impacts in a country that does not use modern economic 
and business practices creates issues with research. For example, indexes such as the 
Global Competitive Index used for previous case studies is not available for Afghanistan. 
However, what is established is how much economic aid the USG has sent to Afghanistan 
historically. There was limited information available that detailed SOF’s involvement in 
economic development in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has received $500 million dollars in 
economic aid annually since FY2018, with the request for FY2020 coming in at $400 
million dollars. Programs supported by economic assistance included rule of law 
improvement programs, infrastructure projects, democracy and governance assistance, 
education programs, health facilities, and agricultural programs.228 This information does 
not give a clear insight into the effectiveness and tangible results of economic and 
development programs in Afghanistan. 
One initiative that leveraged economic development in support overarching USG 
strategic goals was Task Force Business for Stability Operations (TFBSO) which was 
originally implemented in Iraq, and then expanded into Afghanistan in 2009.229 TFBSO 
focused on three lines of effort: extractives, investment, and indigenous industries. This 
cross-collaboration between DOD and USAID disbursed nearly $1.5 billion dollars during 
the programs lifetime in terms of economic development support to Afghan industries from 
2011–2013.230 Although this initiative seemed to be a step in the right direction, engaging 
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a large variety of stakeholders (DOD, USAID, State department, and Afghan businesses) 
was ultimately unsuccessful due to policy resistance from within the USG: 
Several respondents expressed the feeling that it was this inability to gain 
buy-in for TFBSO in Washington, rather than operational successes or 
failures, that ultimately led to the organization’s closure.231 
Not only has the U.S. made significant monetary investments in Afghanistan, but 
we see foreign investments, too. Looking at foreign direct investment (FDI) in Afghanistan 
over the last twenty years, a clear trend has been established, investment trended upwards 
after years of U.S. intervention and spiked in 2006 to nearly 4.5% net inflow of GDP. 
During this same time, troop levels in Afghanistan were on the rise, reaching nearly 20,000 
troops in 2006. While there is no correlation between foreign investment and perceived 
security levels based on troop numbers, what is clear is that 2006 saw a significant drop 
off in foreign direct investment, falling below 0.5% post-2018 despite rising troop levels 
during the 2011 surge, and then the eventual decline through 2018.232 
FDI provides only one insight into how finances impact the overall economic 
growth of a country. In their 2020 study, Impact of FDI on economic growth, the authors 
Baiashvili and Gattini propose potential impacts, “FDI does not only provide needed 
financing for capital accumulation, but also supports the import of positive externalities in 
terms of new inputs and foreign technologies in the production function.”233 What is more 
uncertain however, is the relationship between security levels in a country and the 
propensity for outside companies to invest in a country. Why Afghanistan’s FDI seems to 
decline over recent years is hard to say, but there could be a correlation between perceived 
security and willingness for companies to invest and send resources to a potentially volatile 
location.  
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Despite the significant economic investments made by the U.S. in Afghanistan, 
they are drastically less than the amount of security assistance the U.S. invested in 
Afghanistan, including SOF. Financial investments make up one part of the operational 
environment, as it is critical to assess all elements. This brings us to the financial element 
of national power that will be assessed next. 
5. Financial 
Attempting to improve national governance and sovereignty in a country that by 
and large governs, creates issues in funding a large national government. Governance is 
tied to a budget and dollars are needed to fund a variety of initiatives, including security. 
Blum and Conway argue that taxation and funding directly impact the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of the state, and should seek over time to decrease the legitimacy of an 
insurgency.234 External funding plays a huge role in enabling insurgent operations, as 
quoted by Jeremy Weinstein, “resources generated from external patrons require little if 
any civilian labor, so groups with such support remain largely independent of civilian 
populations for their survival.” 235  Research into how the financial instrument has 
supported other efforts to include SOF operations was not apparent. However, from 
looking at a 2011 press statement from the Department of Treasury, it appears it has 
supported operations in a variety of means: 
Attacking the finances of terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Denying 
the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan access to 
funds has long been a priority within TFI. Treasury has intensified its efforts 
in this arena over the past year as part of the President’s enhanced strategic 
focus in this critical region. Our approach is grounded in efforts to disrupt 
and dismantle illicit financial networks and to build domestic capacities 
within Afghanistan, all designed to undermine the financial networks of 
illicit actors and safeguard the nascent, but growing Afghan financial sector. 
Treasury staff in Washington and on the ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
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and the Gulf are working with others to aggressively attack the finances of 
the Taliban, al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups operating in the region.236 
These efforts may have been persistent at the national level and were undoubtedly 
instrumental either targeting key Taliban and Al Qaida leaders or helping to remove their 
access to funding streams. However, the financial arm alone cannot target these 
organizations at scale. Most likely, considerable intelligence and information were handed 
off to SOF and other military elements to take lethal action, or to law enforcement 
components to arrest insurgent leaders. These efforts did not fix all the systemic problems 
in Afghanistan, and national and even provincial level government funding to include 
taxation have been stymied, (lacking attention,) as USSOF and other elements continue to 
chase insurgent leaders with lethal targeting efforts. (what is the foregoing sentence trying 
to convey?) 
6. Intelligence 
Intelligence undoubtedly provides a key component to any effort or conflict. 
Traditionally, intelligence is considered a military function, and could arguably be lumped 
under the military instrument of DIMEFIL. However, it is important to distinguish it,  
especially in the unique case of Afghanistan. Intelligence operations from a U.S. 
perspective could include elements of SOF, traditional military intelligence capabilities, 
and other governmental agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, as 
the U.S. focused heavily on growing Afghan capabilities to include intelligence and SOF 
contributed to this effort, it is important to look at how effective such capabilities were. It 
is also important to identify how well intelligence was integrated to other operations and 
instruments of DIMEFIL, as intelligence alone does not win a war. Actioning intelligence 
is what generates effects. 
One of the challenges of Afghanistan for SOF, both in conducting unilateral 
operations and in advising Afghan Security Forces (ANSF) was a lack of intelligence 
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infrastructure, and often ANSF were dependent on coalition units for intelligence.237 
Sustainability is a recurring theme in Afghanistan. British SOF would continually provide 
only intelligence capabilities which they believed Afghan units would have access to post-
coalition withdrawal.238 For USSOF advising Afghan National Army Special Operations 
Forces (ANASOF), USSOF imposed their high op-tempo on ANASOF by using U.S. 
intelligence assets, often overwhelming the newly established capabilities of ANASOF to 
conduct synchronized operations, which forces ANASOF to become completely dependent 
on USSOF for intelligence and operational planning.239 This drive for lethal action once 
again comes up, as U.S. units continually pushed their Afghan units to conduct raids and 
other kinetic focused actions to presumedly put pressure on Taliban and insurgent forces. 
Intelligence traditionally enables military and law enforcement operations, however if most 
of the intelligence was generated from U.S. capabilities, Afghan intelligence capabilities 
simply do not have a chance to develop and improve. This lack of sustainability in Afghan 
initiatives has prolonged the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. 
7. Law Enforcement 
The community-based approach to policing has been central to the village stability 
operations (VSO) program, where local stakeholders such as tribal leaders share the 
responsibility of security with their American and Coalition counterparts. This focus gave 
rise to initiatives such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) which was a key element to the 
VSO program where SOF would work with local key leaders and find members of each 
village who could work as security with a minimal police function.240 This initiative saw 
good adoption by local communities, however it was wrought with challenges such as 
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vetting for ALP members to prevent insurgents from infiltrating ALP organizations, and 
funding primarily came from the USG and NATO partners.241 One of the benefits of this 
program was the advent of a combined approach in these villages, where ALP units would 
often be stood up with development projects designed to give an economic boost to the 
village and improve quality of life, at least minimally, for the village. As of 2020, it appears 
that the program was on the cutting block for funding, with the Afghan government hoping 
to start an ALP weapon reclamation program, with the aim being to push current ALP 
members into the Afghan National Army and other Afghan security apparatus, thereby 
prevent adding to insurgent populations. As force numbers in Afghanistan continue to 
decline, the long-term benefit and fate of programs such as the ALP remain uncertain.242 
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
One of the things the U.S. military and specifically SOF does well in low intensity 
conflicts where near peer threats are non-existent is use lethality and create space where 
lethal acts impose high cost on insurgent groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Did 
this high cost imposed through the countless drone strikes, high value target kill/capture 
missions, and partner national security force capacity building generate any effect? Only 
time will tell whether these operations can contribute to lasting peace in Afghanistan and 
the creation of a sovereign security partner for the United States. But looking at investments 
over the last 20 years of conflict suggest that the limited successes achieved militarily in 
the form of kinetic action through targeting of Taliban leadership, or training Afghan 
security forces will not create a stable environment that aligns with U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan. 
The premise of this thesis is not to argue that a smaller footprint could have turned 
the tide in the war. Instead, much like an investment portfolio of stocks and bonds, perhaps 
 
241 Mark Moyar, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police (Macdill AFB, FL: Joint 
Special Operations University, October, 2014), https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU14-
7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf, 10. 
242 Howard Altman, “Why dissolving the Afghan Local Police Program troubles its American 




a more balanced approach of diverse activities across the DIMEFIL spectrum would have 
contributed to mission success. Cultural challenges have been highlighted through this 
analysis, evidenced through the USG’s attempt at partner capacity building in a multi-
ethnic and multi-tribal environment that makes up Afghanistan. SOF are expected to be the 
premier force capable of engaging with a wide variety of cultures and language, and yet 
Afghanistan seemed to be out of reach for this full cultural literacy concept for which SOF 
often assumes capability. SOF clearly has contributed in developing a significant SOF 
partner capability in Afghanistan, capable of standing on its own and executing its own 
security operations, but is it enough to engage with just security forces only? Could 
engagements within the civil domain such as the development of more local businesses and 
increasing local police capabilities have made a difference? Perhaps not, due to the 
daunting complexity of the Afghanistan environment. 
E. FINDINGS 
As presented in this case study, the USG as a whole made a significant investment 
in the development of Afghanistan’s capacity to become a legitimate and self-governing 
nation through large troop deployments, significant economic and development 
investments, and time, as Afghanistan is now America’s longest standing war after nearly 
20 years of conflict. What does the USG have to show for it? The case of U.S. involvement 
in Afghanistan shows that simply doubling down and increasing troop deployments and 
economic expenditure does not translate into achieving strategic objectives. SOF could 
potentially bridge the gap in helping prioritize high value areas for FDI with security 
resources to encourage FDI and enable long term economic growth. The U.S. experience 
in Afghanistan shows that U.S. and coalition intelligence alone cannot win the war or 
achieve strategic objectives, and that partner intelligence and synchronization is necessary, 
which has been significantly lacking in American trained Afghan units, even those 
developed by SOF such as ANASOF.243 It shows that unmeasurable matters, such as 
information messaging and cultural nuances, and that disparate agendas across unified 
action partners does not necessarily correlate to improving the strategic forecast. It is also 
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this author’s opinion that the greatest impediment to achieving some winnable situation in 
Afghanistan was the over reliance on military action, and a failure to balance all elements 




IX. COMMON THEMES AND THREADS 
To provide a holistic picture of how SOF integrates into the elements of DIMEFIL 
and engages with the civil domain, this section discusses the common themes and threads 
that emerge across each of the case studies examined in this thesis. Writing this thesis, I 
originally thought I was investigating how to use DIMEFIL to integrate SOF into all the 
instruments of national power. What I found repeatedly across the case studies presented 
here is that the DIMEFIL model is too simple of a model to try to apply to the matter of 
statecraft. The level at which SOF often finds itself operating has far reaching strategic 
effects from its operations. Often what I found is that practitioners attempted to parse out 
each of the letters of DIMEFIL and “check the box” to make sure their operations addressed 
each of the elements. This perspective has been shared increasingly in recent years as 
strategists embrace the increased rapidness of change and growing complexities of our 
modern world. John Meiser says it best, in his white paper, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) 
Strategy”: 
The concept of a comprehensive or whole-of-government approach to 
solving strategic problems fosters an overemphasis on simplistically 
applying resources—the means. By this logic, whatever the problem is, 
simply apply all the elements of national power— diplomatic, information, 
military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement 
(DIMEFIL)—and the problem is solved. Under this approach, the strategist 
simply fills in each box or, better yet, creates a diagram showing each 
element of national power as a line of effort directed at an enemy center of 
gravity or critical vulnerability.244 
However, after analyzing each case study, the things that stand out are the operations where 
the main force, SOF or otherwise, integrated itself into DIMEFIL; and where they appeared 
to make themselves aware of the finer nuances of their operating environment, were better 
at balancing operations across DIMEFIL. This approach permitted SOF, as in the Colombia 
and Philippines cases, to eventually achieve some form of victory. 
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Two interesting cases that compare and contrast this point were Afghanistan and 
the Greek Civil War. Both cases saw lethality and military force as a contributing factor to 
the cases’ success in the case of the Greek Civil War, or failure in the case of Afghanistan. 
The DIMEFIL approach offers only one of the conditions that could be considered for each 
success and failure. There were many contributing factors in the case of Afghanistan that 
led to failure by USSOF and the USG beyond simply using too much force, such as pre-
existing societal and cultural structures that made national governance difficult. In the cases 
of Colombia and the Philippines, both saw success over a ten-plus year time horizon with 
limited U.S. military assistance in terms of number of personnel deployed to each country. 
In both cases, USSOF found ways to tie in closely with U.S. country teams and coordinate 
operations and initiatives, instead of creating redundant or disparate efforts. In the case of 
the Crimean Annexation, Russia enjoyed several advantages considering the amount of 
power the oligarchy controls, that allowed it to effectively time its various approaches 
across DIMEFIL as it challenged Ukrainian sovereignty. I’ve demonstrated in this thesis 
that DIMEFIL can be used as a model to assess a country’s approach to competition or 
conflict when attempting to identify how much lethality is necessary to achieve a political 
objective, but it alone does not give a planner or practitioner of warfare or statecraft the 
full picture. Other factors play into the overall assessment of a security situation, and one 
would not be prudent in deferring to  the use of only one model or another when developing 
strategy for effective statecraft. 
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X. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
All research comes with certain limitations, and this thesis is no different. For this  
research, only five case studies were selected that highlighted the use of various elements 
of DIMEFIL and their application in a slightly different way. Additional case studies could 
have uncovered additional insights, but a mass synthesis of every potentially relevant case 
study is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the selected cases were chosen because 
they represent varying experiences of conflict. Each of the five case studies were selected 
for specific reasons. Colombia shows a conflict where the U.S. invested over a long term 
horizon, balanced its use of DIMEFIL, and enabled its partner, the Colombians, to begin 
exporting security. The Greek Civil War showed a much shorter time period of investment 
from the U.S. where lethality and economic assistance stopped the spread of communism 
in northern Greece. The Philippines shows a complex operating environment in the Pacific 
area of operations that required USSOCOM to advise their Philippine partners on defeating 
multiple insurgent groups simultaneously. The Russian annexation of Crimea looks at this 
research question from a Russian perspective and addresses how the Russians sought to 
use elements of DIMEFIL in their operations while leveraging other population bases. 
Afghanistan was selected because it still has not reached resolution for U.S. interests after 
20 years of conflict, and shows how overwhelming use of force does not necessarily 
translate into victory.  
To improve this research, a case study from the Chinese perspective and how they 
would have potentially incorporated elements of DIMEFIL in their operations might have 
been beneficial; which is a great prospect for future research. Several of the case studies in 
this thesis highlight internal security issues, such as dealing with terrorism or an 
insurgency. This approach was intentional, as case studies were chosen based on the use of 
DIMEFIL in USG operations, and not necessarily whether the host state faced an internal 
or external security issue. Future research should examine case studies that provide 
opportunities to discuss external security issues. Moreover, this research does not examine 
cases across each major geographic region of the U.S. military’s combatant commands. 
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This limitation presents another opportunity for future research to explore by investigating 
cases relevant to Pacific Command (PACOM) and elsewhere (e.g., Africa).  
One of the most significant limitations uncovered in this research was the simplicity 
and redundancy of the DIMEFIL model. DIMEFIL certainly presents an excellent starting 
point when discussing the elements of national power that could potentially affect a 
strategic campaign in a country during great power competition. Yet it has challenges. One 
of those challenges in using DIMEFIL was the similarity and unclear distinction between 
the “economic” and “financial” elements of DIMEFIL. My conclusion after performing 
the research suggests that the DIMEFIL model was originally intended to be applied to a 
counter insurgent or terrorist centric conflict where the main aggressor is a non-state actor. 
In such instances, it was assumed that the economic instrument of power had more to do 
with the economic state of a country, region, or area, and that financial had more to do with 
the financial transactions funding a non-state actor. In cases such as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria, where this non-state actor acted in a similar fashion to a state, it can be easy 
to differentiate between economic and financial. Yet, when moving to the state and 
international system level, I found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between economic 
activity and financial transactions as the two typically go hand in hand. Meiser would share 
my sentiments in difficulty of applying the DIMEFIL model to complex problems found 
in conflict: 
But, starting with the notion of seven and only seven forms of national 
power and all of them should always be utilized to implement a whole-of-
government solution is infantile. In fact, General Dempsey recently seems 
to have added another element of national power to the list: energy. So now 
we have DIMEFIL? The point is there is no set number of tools a 
government can use to solve a problem, to think otherwise is foolhardy.245 
The DIMEFIL model can work in limited instances when applied to great power 
competition, but as with all models, at some point it no longer adequately models reality. I 
recommend USSOCOM looks at developing its own model to assess all the elements of 
national power it often leverages as it incorporates other USG agencies and organizations 
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into its operations. One of those areas it does not address that has become increasingly 
more relevant is the cyber domain. Along similar lines, social media’s relevance to 
information domain has become increasingly important and may warrant its own separate 
assessment for operations.  
Each of the case studies in this research looks at slightly different conditions, but 
generally the same problem, with the challenge being to find the correct application of 
lethality and military force. One of the challenges of research was identifying case studies 
which could potentially reflect future conditions of competition and conflict  in which the 
U.S. may find itself. The case studies of Colombia, Philippines, Afghanistan, and the Greek 
Civil war all deal with sub-state conflicts. The Greek Civil War, and Crimea each deal with 
conflicts that transcended the state level, whose effects were felt on the global stage by 
great powers. It was important for case study selection to find case studies that had ample 
data and previous research that could describe the nature of the conflict, and depict U.S., 
or in the case of Crimea- Russian, intervention. Some approaches in the cases of internal 
state conflict may still provide only context and insights at the state and sub-state levels. 
However, I believe the overall assessment of how SOF enabled or did not enable a balanced 
approach to using elements of DIMEFIL remains invaluable and will apply throughout the 
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XI. SUGGESTED FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many topics that could be further explored in this area of research. While 
some methods were uncovered that could be implemented by USSOCOM, more research 
could identify specific actions in the civil environment which may produce the most effects 
across the instruments of national power. Research focused on identification of how 
influence is developed in the civil domain could illuminate which types of organizations 
and individuals would be most helpful to SOF conducting operations in a civil 
environment.  
The DIMEFIL model was chosen for this thesis due to its simplicity and ability to 
capture most of the instruments of national power that contribute to strategy making. While 
this model suited the purposes for this research, future research should look at identifying 
a new model that better encapsulates other elements that are currently at play in the 
operational environment such as cyber-related capabilities and the growing relevance of 
social media. Political warfare is another area that should be looked at for inclusion in a 
similar DIMEFIL model, as the world has been witness to Russian and other nations’ 
attempts to meddle in political elections around the globe.246 A more robust version of the 
DIMEFIL model that could distinguish irregular warfare capabilities from conventional 
warfare capabilities could provide planners a more holistic assessment of how resources 
were being allocated towards either conventional warfare forces such as U.S. Army 
infantry divisions or unconventional warfare forces such as U.S. Army Special Forces. 
Further research should explore how increasing allocations to one instrument of 
power, for example increasing the budget of the Department of Defense, either improves 
or detracts the strength of other instruments. I recommend using a form of systems 
modeling to investigate this topic. further, as it was an original avenue intended to pursue, 
but was eventually disregarded to scope this research. (do you need the 2nd half of the 
foregoing sentence?) 
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Finally, the future of conflict always remains vague to the practitioner and scholar 
alike. Hopefully this thesis uncovered a small glimpse at the future of warfare where civil 
components will take a more active role in the outcome of competition or conflict. Warfare 
in the future may look less like conventional ‘force on force’ large-scale combat operations. 
In that eventuality the ability to influence and control a population in the civil domain 





A. A COHESIVE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS 
Going through each of these case studies brought several proverbial ‘elephants in 
the room’ to the forefront of the strategic thoughts of this paper. One challenge is how the 
DOD conceptualizes the problem set and the contemporary operating environment. One of 
those elements is the challenge of synchronizing efforts across not just USSOCOM and the 
DOD, but the whole of government. This is challenged by a clear lack of doctrine or system 
for the established collaboration and coordination among agencies to achieve mutually 
supporting agendas. The second challenge is how SOF trains. Most units will conduct some 
sort of pre-mission training prior to deployment, most likely spending time at one of the 
combat training centers. This presents an opportunity for SOF to train more extensively on 
understanding and operating in the civil domain. 
B. JOINT AND INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE 
Competitors of the United States often appear to fuse their civil and military effects 
and engagements, which combines elements of their elements of national power into one 
approach so they can synchronize resources and objectives to support their national 
security objectives. While the U.S. has a multitude of agencies capable of engaging other 
elements outside of the realm of security, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
or Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of Commerce and Agriculture, USAID, 
and State Department, no one is more uniquely positioned, nor has the capability and 
resources to do this at scale other than USSOCOM. These facts do not diminish the need 
for increased communications, coordination, and collaboration across agencies, it only 
makes it more necessary. However, DOD, and specifically USSOCOM must engage with 
the civil environment, potentially through a DIMEFIL framework that synchronizes all 
elements of national power, to deter and counter competitor attempts at gaining traction in 
contested spaces.  
While the U.S. military developed new doctrine to face emerging threats, all USG 
agencies need to develop and continually update their strategy for future competition and 
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conflict. Most recently FM 324 was developed to deal with the insurgencies that had 
destabilized Iraq and Afghanistan. 247  FM 324 evolved thoughts on new age 
counterinsurgency doctrine because both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army 
adopted it, two distinct land forces. Just as the USG developed joint doctrine for 
counterinsurgency (COIN), interagency competition doctrine needs to address a whole of 
USG approach. 
Several documents present the current operating environment, and how adversaries 
use hybrid warfare against the United States. However, no doctrine appears to focus solely 
on coordinating multi-agency strategy and tactics to counter hybrid challenges. TC 7–100 
defines hybrid threats for training environments, but fails to address strategic 
implications.248 Joint Special Operations University published a report discussing the rise 
in hybrid challenges and recommended changes to U.S. policy, emphasizing 
USSOCOM. 249  The Asymmetric Warfare Group routinely publishes supplements 
highlighting Russian tactics, but often does not address the broader picture and challenge 
that facing these threats requires.250 Fighting in a hybrid warfare environment, above or 
below the level of armed conflict, requires synchronizing all elements of national power, 
and none of these resources, even integrated country strategies (ICS), accomplishes this. 
An ICS defines the USG’s goals for diplomacy, development and defense for a given 
country, but fail to describe how and when agencies work together, share resources, and 
maximize opportunities to face hybrid challenges.251 These hybrid warfare documents 
show that a gap in inter-agency doctrine exists and why the USG must develop doctrine to 
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continue to compete in the international system. More research and doctrine would also be 
required as to how best to incorporate private sector into similar discussions with an 
integrated whole of government approach, and how SOF can best support such discussions 
while engaging partners and operating in the civil domain in forward environments. 
C. COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS 
A useful place to test new strategies for future investment and integrating DIMEFIL 
into operations are combat training centers (CTCs), such as the National Training Center 
at Ft. Irwin, CA, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA. Each of these 
centers are used by SOF to train for upcoming rotations and deployments. During the 
2000s, these centers focused on counterinsurgency training for units rotating through, to 
get ready for their deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. This served a purpose, but was 
still reactionary in nature, as it was training for a conflict already going on. Currently, CTCs 
focus on direct action both for SOF and conventional forces, as lethality has become the 
focus of training given the outlook from leaders within the DOD of a possible large scale 
combat operation on the horizon. While this is beneficial and represents part of the 
investment the DOD needs to make specifically as it pertains to SOF, it is only part of it. 
The other part is irregular warfare, and the investment that needs to be made during training 
like at CTCs and other joint and combined exercises. These types of investments must 
focus on other elements of DIMEFIL beyond the military realm, specifically SOF’s ability 
to leverage the information and intelligence. This investment will pay significant 
dividends, as shown earlier how adversaries are seeking to leverage military capabilities to 
dominate in places such as the information domain. Each of the strategies presented could 








Lethality will always be necessary to deter adversaries and prevent capability 
overmatch in conflicts. However, lethality is not always the solution to solving conflicts 
no matter the scale. Future competition and conflict will require USSOCOM to use the 
appropriate amounts of force at ideal times, along with other elements of national power. 
Case studies presented in this thesis showed that each operating environment is condition 
dependent, and that for the USG to be successful in achieving its political objectives, it 
must apply the appropriate amounts of each element of national power at ideal times. 
Conflicts are dynamic, and therefore require strategic planners and decision-makers to 
constantly assess current investments of each element of national power and ensure those 
proportions will create future outcomes consistent with U.S. goals. 
In the case of the Greek Civil War, and to some extent Colombia and the 
Philippines, an optimal amount of lethality seemed to be reached as the U.S. adapted its 
approach to each of those conflicts. For the Greek Civil War, U.S. military assistance in 
the form of advisors and material to include firepower such as artillery and air support 
assets enabled the GNA to overpower the DAS in a short time horizon of nearly five years. 
Economic assistance played another significant role in helping the Greek government 
establish legitimacy with its own people as the reach and influence of the DAS slowly 
diminished due to combat operations. In Colombia, the U.S. took a more protracted 
approach, keeping force levels low, but seeking alternative methods in the use of national 
power to achieve synergy across the instruments of DIMEFIL and across U.S. agencies. 
Coordination at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota was critical to this effort, and undoubtedly, 
the low amount of USSOF in Colombia enabled U.S. operations to remain focused on 
supporting overarching U.S. strategic political objectives. As the number of forces in a 
given area grows, the ability for U.S. military planners to synchronize operations and align 
with other government agencies diminish as illustrated by the Afghanistan case study. This 
begs the question whether the nearly 110,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan were truly 
necessary, or simply were viewed as a silver bullet by policy makers hoping to end an 
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already unusually long war that had seen no end in sight. It is important to contrast the time 
horizons of each of these case studies. 
Strategic thinkers and planners should employ multidisciplinary solutions as 
problems continue to grow in complexity. SOF needs to continue to integrate with the 
interagency and private sector, even at the tactical level when the situation dictates. 
Military commanders need to see the operating environment as a complex world, where 
solutions will no longer be as simple as choosing to use force or not to use force.  
The civil domain is the next battlefield of the future and will not look like it has in 
the past, with M1A1 Abrams tanks moving across a desert expanse sighting in T-90s. 
Instead, the battlefield of the future will be fought within and among components of civil 
society. Integrating non-lethal effects such as influence in the information and cyber 
domains, with lethality when relevant, and combining those with other elements of national 
power such as diplomacy, economic and even law enforcement will create solutions closer 
to the strategic political end-states the USG often seeks. 
As warfare becomes more complex and multi-polar, leveraging multiple elements 
of national power is critical to success in competition, conflict, and beyond. USSOCOM 
must identify how it plans to develop capabilities and forces that can operate in the civil 
domain. USSOCOM must invest in learning how to incorporate multiple elements of 
DIMEFIL into its operations for the most effect. It must continue to identify how 
competitors of the U.S. leverage the civil domain and other elements of national power for 
their gain, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
The civil domain presents an opportunity for SOF to increase its direct impact on 
great power competition and focus on long term strategic gains. The DOD continues to 
respond well to crises as they surface, and politicians ask the U.S. military to do more 
globally in fiscally constrained environments. The need for a clear investment strategy for 
SOF with estimated return on investment needs to be established, and the civil domain 
cannot be overlooked. Any investment strategy will need to be integrated horizontally and 
vertically across the department, and laterally across other agencies, taking into account 
the global reach of SOF, and the need for multiple elements of DIMEFIL to be leveraged 
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simultaneously. The DOD has been challenged with thinking creatively about future 
conflict and identifying what needs to be done now to invest for the future. By looking at 
the ends, ways, and means adversaries of the U.S. seek to employ in the civil domain and 
how they fuse civil with military capabilities, the DOD should assess each element of 
DIMEFIL and determine what can be gleaned as it develops future investments in national 
security. After analyzing the resources, objectives, and methods adversaries are currently 
pursuing, the DOD must invest now in its employment of SOF in the civil domain. SOF 
can meet challenges from adversaries along the DIMEFIL spectrum if DOD can recognize 
and define how SOF will contribute to an investment strategy for a future in the civil 
domain. As the DOD looks to the future to determine what investments need to be made in 
the present to attain long term strategic goals, it must think creatively about not just 
conflict, but its employment of SOF and how SOF contributes to goal attainment 
The civil domain presents an opportunity for the Department of Defense and 
specifically USSOCOM. The civil domain is also vast, it is essentially the world as we 
know it, and as we don’t know it. But if the DOD stays focused on the military components 
of the operating environment, it is opening itself up to additional risk in the form of 
adversaries who seek to operate in the gap between civil and military capabilities. The 
United States has the advantage of its innovative American economy supporting its 
adaptive military forces, so change is possible, and fueling the collaboration between the 
public and private sector is essential to drive U.S. foreign policy forward. 
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